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South-East Asian SPECTRUM

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Denis Warner

The Future of Taiwan
Thomas Marks

Sino-Burmese Relations
Edwin Martin

Japan and the US in Micronesia
Felix Moos

Regional Organization
Peter Lyon

Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet Rift
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ETNAM: *Although the sudden fall of South Vietnam is often presented as a function of the ineptitude of South Vietnam's leadership, the author shows that Hanoi had planned the all-out push for victory well in advance, and "in absolute violation of the Paris Agreement". What is more, he does not see any likelihood of a lessening of "evangelical fervour" in Vietnamese Communism, now that Hanoi's military goals in Vietnam have been achieved.*

Living with the New Vietnam

Denis Warner

I WAS in my room at the Hotel Metropole in Hanoi at noon on 21 July 1954, when the BBC broadcast the details of the eva Agreement. After the broadcast was over I t across the road to the Government offices to on the news to the *Chef de cabinet*, a macist named Quang, who, in his former city as deputy mayor of Hanoi, had been a good useful friend. He gripped the table and stood tears in his eyes when I told him. "It is finish, friend," he said. "Finish. Finish. Finish. I shall o Saigon, but what is the use? All we will have e will be a sentence deferred for two years."

Because of circumstances that neither Quang anyone else could have envisaged, the two years ched into nearly twenty-one, and the South nam Hanoi acquired when its tanks rolled into presidential palace in Saigon on 30 April last is similar to the South Vietnam of 1954 only in e. Hanoi might have digested unsophisticated h Vietnam in the mid-'fifties with relatively little culty. How will it fare in 1976? And what sort of hbour may we expect the new Vietnam to be?

* * * * * * *

N ATTEMPTING to answer these questions, the techniques and the nature of the camns, both political and military, that were ini- d by North Vietnam to win the war are of direct rtance, not merely because of what they have eved but because they are immediately relevant to sort of state that is now in the making in nam.

In the closing days of the war, in Saigon there a pathetic belief (sedulously cultivated by Hanoi) that there would be an interregnum after the shooting stopped, a period variously believed likely to last months, or even years, in which a sort of half-way house to Communism would be established. The Paris Agreement would be fully implemented. Big Minh would be acceptable to Hanoi as the leader of one of the three parties to the National Council of National Conciliation and Concord, and, together with the Third Force and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, would help to introduce the Vietnamese people slowly to the joys of Socialism.

Even members of the National Liberation Front were hoodwinked. No one has tried to estimate how many people, who would otherwise have tried to leave South Vietnam during the last weeks of the war, stayed behind because they were lulled into this false sense of security, but certainly they would run into hundreds of thousands. As late as the afternoon of 28 April, just an hour or two before Big Minh was installed as Head of State — and the 130 millimetre guns opened up on Tan Son Nhut — the feeling persisted that the Northern tanks would halt outside Saigon and all, more or less, would be well.

All of this was a gigantic, carefully conceived hoax. Writing in *SPECTRUM* in April 1975, Alan Ned Sabrosky directed proper attention to what should have been obvious to all concerned with the Vietnam War: Communist strategy does not make the distinction between the military and political aspects of conflict, and both are a continuum along which the Communist policy-makers move in accordance with the situation(1).

* * * * * * *

IT WAS expedient in the face of the failure of the Easter offensive in 1972 for Hanoi to settle down to what the United States accepted as serious negotiations (though the South Vietnamese leaders knew better). It was expedient again in the face of the intensive bombing of the North to sign the Paris Agreement in 1973. But anyone who failed to understand that this was all part of the protracted war did not understand the nature of the war, or Hanoi's goals. The National Liberation Front, the People's Revolutionary Party and the Provisional Revolutionary Government all had important parts to play in the war effort, but as agents of Hanoi, not as separate institutions, not certainly as the representatives of Southern national Communism. The intention was to conceal Hanoi's role in the war and to give the illusion not only that the struggle commanded widespread Southern support but that the impetus and the motivation all came from the South.

The Front numbered genuine Southern nationalists among its members, but the People's Revolutionary Party as the "vanguard" of the Front, called the tune. A copy of the instructions from Hanoi under which it was set up was captured in 1962. It said that the Party should appear to be a new party and look independent, though in fact it was to be nothing else than a unified North-South Vietnam Lao Dong Party under the orders of the Hanoi Politburo. Robert F. Turner summed up the relationship appropriately when he said the PRP "maintained complete control of the NLF, because the latter had no vertical chain of command of its own"(2).

Just as the PRP was set up by Hanoi as the vehicle through which the war effort could be directed, negotiations demanded the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. After its creation in 1969 it served an important function in the diplomatic and political struggle against the United States and the Saigon Government. It appealed for, and won, international recognition in Communist and Third World countries, but in no sense was it a government, nor did it perform the functions of government. With the war won, it was denied even the chance of playing any sort of role in the National Council of National Conciliation and Concord, which was conveniently thrown into the dustbin, along with the rest of the Paris Agreement. There was no longer any need for subterfuge. The indigenous Southern military forces were officially integrated with the Northern armed forces, and the PRP lost even the fiction of its separate identity. In one step, therefore, the theoretically significant, but, in fact, non-existent, bases of separate Southern power — the Party and the Army — were dissolved. Control everywhere in the South now passed into the hands of Military Revolutionary Committees, which were both Army and Party, and therefore under absolute Northern control. The two men who counted now in South Vietnam were not the lea of the PRG but Pham Hung, Southern-born fourth-ranking member of the Politburo of the Dong Party, and General Tran Van Tra, Southern-born but an alternate member of Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party and years deputy commander of all forces in the So In other words, the war had not ended in victory the PRG, but in outright Northern conquest, w will be confirmed by elections to unify North South during the current year.

This was always the intention. While non-Communist world was beguiled by World P Council and other propaganda at the beginnin 1975 with demands for the full implementatio the Paris Agreement(3), the North Vietnamese P buro had already thrown the agreement into wastepaper basket and had decided on a m military offensive to win the war. The Paris Ag ment propaganda was designed to serve a smokescreen for the offensive, and it achieve purpose very well. All the old clichés about corruption of the Thieu Government, grossly exa rated accounts of the numbers of political pris in the South, and cries of outrage when s Communist newspapermen were arrested in Sa were among the techniques used to condition US international public opinion and in effect to tra the guilt in advance for Western newspaper-re from the attackers to the attacked.

There was nothing new in this tactic. For the manipulation of international public opinio been an essential part of Hanoi's campaign. H understood the weaknesses in the democratic sy and worked on them. "Giap's own best contribu to the art of revolutionary war was probably estimate of the political-psychological shortcomin a democratic system when faced with an inconcl military operation," wrote Bernard Fall in 196 "In all likelihood, Giap concluded, public opini the democracy will demand an end to the 'us bloodshed', or its legislature will insist on kno for how long it will have to vote astronomical cr without a clear-cut victory in sight."

Even at a time when the United States 500,000 troops in the field and optimism in shington was high, Hanoi persisted in this view May 1967, General Nguyen Chi Thanh, writin the *People's Army Review* under the pseudony Truong Son, said that the United States, with a forces, had been unable to prevent the flow of a ance from the North to the South and that vi could be denied to the United States, however the force it committed. Already he was countin the day when the Americans, faced with inconclusive military operation, could be force their own domestic pressures, carefully manipul to pull out. After that any settlement could n

herwise than leave the initiative in the hands of anoi(5).

* * * * * * *

IT IS nevertheless a cause for some surprise that Hanoi should feel, with the victory won, that it n afford to admit the truth: that the Paris greement was regarded as a scrap of paper, and at the Spring offensive last year was not a hastily provised campaign to take advantage of the Thieu overnment's military and psychological blunders in ntral Vietnam and the Central Highlands, but s very carefully and deliberately conceived long in vance and in absolute violation of the Paris Agreeent.

This unique admission bears the joint signaes of General Vo Nguyen Giap and General Van en Dung, Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese my(6). "The greatest surprise for the enemy was timing of the general offensive," the two generals ote. "This is one of the essential points which ade them completely passive strategically. The US perialists and their henchmen wrongly reckoned at they might have another two years to carry out ir sabotage of the Paris Agreement."

Although deference to dialectical materialism netimes demands that facts must be tailored after event to meet ideological requirements, this is the case in the Giap-Dung analysis. It is much re than an account of past events. As its title, "A w Development of the Art of Leading a Revolunary War", suggests, it is a recipe book for olutionary war, a new primer for liberation forces rywhere. Mao Tse-tung may have known how to anize a peasant revolt: Giap and Dung found the y to engage the most powerful country in the world l still emerge victorious.

To begin with, the Party is given the credit for aking a correct appraisal of the correlation of ces between ourselves and the enemy, perceiving emergence of a historic opportunity and taking strategic decision to liberate the South...". The ty analysed the strength of the South Vietnamese es and assessed the US capacity to react to the rthern offensive. It also made a "correct appraisal our own capabilities, of the capabilities of our y, our people and the entire country... Never ore had the correlation of forces between ourselves the enemy been so favourable to us. After ing driven the Americans out, our people now all the necessary bases and conditions to move ward and topple the puppets, even if the US uld recklessly use its military forces to reinvade country."

At no time, the article reveals, was the Spring nsive intended to be limited. It did not gain mentum because of the grievous miscalculations by President Thieu in the Central Highlands and Central Vietnam: it was always the offensive to win the war. The possibility of renewed US intervention at various levels was considered and counter-measures were included in the contingency planning. Whatever the level of US intervention, however, it was decided that this should not in any way modify the plan to go for all-out victory.

Giap and Dung do not reveal when the decision was made to launch the offensive. They do make it abundantly clear, however, that the decision must have been taken a very, very long time in advance. They say "we had made great efforts to build many large strategic army columns, composed of many modern technical units, especially tank, armour, artillery and anti-aircraft units... capable of conducting combined offensives on a very large scale." This sort of preparation requires not months but years and necessitated, among other things, the large-scale expansion of the North Vietnamese Army. During the last year of the war the NVA increased in size from 18 infantry divisions (plus two training divisions) to 24 infantry divisions (plus three training divisions), and the number of men in the regular army rose from 570,000 to 685,000(7).

The great road-building programme through South Vietnam that facilitated the rapid deployment of these forces had already been initiated by NVA engineers long before the signing of the Paris Agreement. It continued rapidly thereafter. In fact, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the decision to embark on the major war-winning offensive must have been made *before* the Paris Agreement was signed, and may well have been the underlying motive in the North Vietnamese negotiations. Once the Americans were finally out of the way, the road to Saigon was open. And this was the only goal in the Spring offensive.

* * * * * * *

IT IS against this background that General Dung's separate article on "Some Problems of Combining Economic Development With the Consolidation of National Defence"(8) must be read. The article, published in December 1974, when the Northern forces were already moving into position for the Spring offensive, was essentially forward-looking, with the coming military campaign quite peripheral to the main theme, — the post-war creation of a major industrial and military Power in Vietnam. Dung admits quite freely the debt that Hanoi owed to "fraternal" Socialist countries for their military and economic assistance. From this he draws the conclusion that Vietnam must now accept similar responsibilities. "In the course of receiving and using the fraternal countries' assistance, our people are bound to contribute to consolidating and developing international solidarity and unity among the fraternal countries and parties, to defending the

Socialist system and increasing its strength and to accelerating the world revolutionary trends...". There is to be no reduction in force strength. Army units are told that they must "eliminate the bad habit of considering their participation in labour and economic development as a temporary task". They must organize their production activities in accordance with their labour task, "while meeting the Army's requirements for building, achieving combat readiness and engaging in combat". New arsenals will be built to produce modern weapons.

Since Dung, like Giap, began the 1975 Spring offensive absolutely confident of victory, and this article is long-term, not short, it is significant that he anticipates only a limited period of peace. It is necessary, he says, to work out air defence and evacuation plans while carrying out economic activities. And he talks of plans to build in peacetime "a number of shelter projects and underground shelters for very important installations". Why, one may well ask? Because there are dangers, perhaps, in fulfilling the "international obligations" that Dung so often refers to?

One answer is that conditions will be so difficult in a unified Vietnam in the initial years that the regime will need the bogey of an external enemy in order to divert attention from domestic grievances and suffering. On the basis of past experience in North Vietnam, and in all provinces in South Vietnam where the Communists took temporary control during the war, and from tons, literally, of captured documents, there was every reason to believe that the Northern victory last April would be followed by a ruthless terror campaign. The fact that this has not yet eventuated, and there have not been the mass killings that characterized the Khmer Rouge take-over in Cambodia, does not mean that this will not still occur. "For a new-born revolutionary power to be lenient with counter-revolutionaries is tantamount to committing suicide", was the view held by Truong Chinh in 1945(9). Under his guidance, the terror began in 1953 and continued intermittently until Ho Chi Minh decided, in 1956, that the excesses had gone too far. Yet Truong Chinh, despite his temporary eclipse two decades ago, is still the second-ranking member of the Politburo, and the Party theoretician.

* * * * * * *

WHAT was true in 1945 is even more likely to be true today. The economic plan, with its emphasis on defence industries and heavy industries, appears to offer the Vietnamese people blood, sweat and tears and very little else. The reaction of the Southerners to currency changes and controls and the new economic zones that have already been established in the countryside do not suggest that the people will willingly accept the new social order. Radio broadcasts from Hanoi and Saigon confirm the reports brought out from South Vietnam of continuing resistance, economic hardship, mass unemployment and general distr

The South Vietnamese do not like being told w to do, especially they do not like being told what to by Northerners. The indigenous Southern cadre syst never recovered from the crippling losses of the offensive in 1968 and the Northerners who have b brought in to do the job are alien to the South environment.

It will be every bit as difficult for the So Vietnamese to accept Communism as it would be for South Koreans, or the West Germans. Although American withdrawal caused unemployment economic difficulties, it did not cause any noticea change in the sophistication of South Vietnam society. Despite the war and the restrictions it impos there was a genuine market economy and a hea respect for free enterprise.

Back in 1939, at the high point of French colo rule, there were fewer than 600 university students 62,000 secondary school students in the South. In 1 there were a hundred thousand students in universities and a million in the secondary schools(After 1970 the Land to the Tiller Law distributed million hectares of rice paddy to 837,000 pea families with proper ownership titles(11). Peasants learned to spread chemical fertilizers on their fields increasingly used tractors and rotary hoes to plo

Saigon went about its business, and its pleas almost oblivious to the presence of the N Vietnamese battle corps in the South. It was rela almost contemptuous of authority and discipline. Di the Confucian, used to regard it as a place of comm and failed to come to terms with it. Thieu, all the p state propaganda to the contrary, did not try. Until fall of Danang at the end of March struck a chil blow, Saigon and the war were worlds apart. Even pessimists thought it might be as long as ten years be the Communists took over.

When the North Vietnamese forces entered city they expected to find a repressed popula welcoming them as liberators. Instead they found million people most of whose unhappiness generated by the Communist victory. It has not b alleviated since. Yet so far, despite scattered contin resistance, Communist rule has been relatively li perhaps because Pham Hung and Tran Van Tra Southerners, are enlightened enough to know that r and ruthless enforcement of the new social order w inevitably send thousands of recruits to the resista movement. More likely, the authorities want to wipe the armed resistance before the coercion begins.

That it will begin is inevitable, especially g the haste with which Hanoi is going about reunificat The dangers inherent in allowing a bourgeois, capit South to exist under the same roof as the Soci

orth are much too great to allow the process of change the South to be evolutionary. Terror is, and always s been, the principal Communist weapon against pular discontent. Stalin killed millions to enforce mmunist rule in the Soviet Union. The Chinese ited until 1951 before promulgating Regulations for e Punishment of Counter Revolutionaries, which led the widespread creation of People's Courts, the land form campaign and the "reform through labour" tem by which millions worked out their suspended tences of death.

Joseph Buttinger describes what happened in rth Vietnam very well. "Their (the North Vietmese leaders) desperate efforts to secure an adequate t for the people were subordinated to their chief ncern — namely, a radical transformation of society cording to what both they and their enemies called 'Marxist' blueprint. No matter what unnecessary ffering this would cause, or what brutal terror it uld require, Northern Vietnam had to be turned into 'socialist' state immediately, one in which neither nomic difficulties nor social discontent would ever allenge the power of the ruling group, the mmunist Party."(12)

* * * * * * *

ONE Westerner who stayed in Saigon for several months after the Communist takeover believes t hostility to Northern control and the sense of rayal felt by Southern Communists will lead within a r to unified Southern resistance to the Northern eover. This seems improbable. No resistance vement (including the Viet Minh, which began to eive aid from China in 1950)(13) has ever succeeded hout external assistance, and there is no one erested enough in the fate of South Vietnam with the ans to help. Moreover, as we have noted, both the thern offshoots of the Northern Army and Party are der Northern control. The forces that might have ued with some authority for some degree of Southern nomy, or which might conceivably have been a lying point for Southern resistance, have ceased to st, and, in fact, have never had a separate existence.

The continuing resistance and the need for large le security forces when the transformation of society lly begins help to explain the need for so large an y. According to Maoist theory, the army exists not rely for the sake of fighting but "to agitate the sses, to organize them, to arm them and to help them ablish revolutionary military power". It is the chief itical power of the State.

That Vietnam will become so preoccupied with its n enormous problems of social and economic onstruction that it will have no time for external erests is, however, unlikely. North Vietnamese nsorship of the Pathet Lao had its origins in the Lao ra, and the mission of ten men, including Souphanouvong, Kaysone and Nou Hak, who were despatched from Ho Chi Minh's headquarters to set in motion the revolt against the French in 1945(14). Later, in 1958, the Viet Minh organized the National United Front of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia under the chairmanship of Ton Duc Thang, chairman of the Lien Viet Front of North Vietnam(15). Two years later two full divisions of Viet Minh "volunteers" carrying Souphanouvong and his ministers and a few hundred Pathet Lao troops with them "liberated" the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. On and off, North Vietnamese troops have been in Laos ever since, Geneva Agreements notwithstanding. In fact, the Vietnam War began in Laos in August 1959, when the North Vietnamese reinvaded to protect their soft underbelly from attack and to keep unfriendly forces away from the Ho Chi Minh trail, which they had begun to extend and enlarge as the first and essential supply route to South Vietnam.

Although there are grave problems with the Khmers Rouges to be overcome (Hanoi trained some 5,000 Cambodian cadres, sometimes referred to as the Khmer Viet Minh), the concept of an association of Indo-China states, dominated by Vietnam is far from dead. It may be counted as ranking highly on Vietnam's list of "international obligations".

* * * * * * *

THE Vietnamese leadership is convinced that it has made a singular contribution to the art of revolutionary warfare. There is precious little deference to be found these days to the teachings of Mao Tse-tung. This is scarcely surprising. The use of regular North Vietnamese forces as a substitute for indigenous Viet Cong in the South is at least a theoretical violation of Mao's principles. But, more importantly, the Vietnamese believe they have developed techniques that are proof against counter-measures which may be adopted. When the United States entered the war with ground forces it became necessary to embark on a protracted struggle which would deny an American victory and continue for so long, and at such cost, that irresistible pressures would build up in the United States against the war.

The North Vietnamese tactics succeeded. The Americans failed to win control of the battlefield, or to shield the South Vietnamese in defence of the pacification programme. They were unable, even, to prevent men and matériel entering South Vietnam from the North. The Vietnamese formula called both for big battles and small battles, and the maintenance of an offensive position by simultaneous attacks on many battlefields, using not only main force units, regional units, and guerrillas, but also political forces. General Nguyen Chi Thanh spelled it out when he wrote: "It is convincingly demonstrated that attacks on the enemy must be mounted simultaneously in three zones (the jungle, the rural and the urban areas) in both the

political and military fields", in order "constantly to hold the initiative on each battlefield in close co-ordination with all others."(16) By the tactic of hitting the Americans in many places while keeping sufficient forces in reserve to mass heavy fighting power in key areas, concentrating and dispersing quickly, fighting small battles and big battles or combining the two, the North Vietnamese, despite their enormous casualties (and partly because of them), denied the United States the victory it had so confidently expected.

These are the sort of techniques the North Vietnamese have to offer. As the only people in the world who have ever fought the United States and w they speak with something like evangelical ferv They want SEATO disbanded not slowly but qu ly(17). The Thai authorities are accused of practising what they preach(18). Implicit in all of th the belief that with the United States no longer dominant voice in South-east Asia, Vietnam, with entirely different sort of voice, will speak, and act, i stead. South-east Asians who share with Lee Kuan the view that the fall of Saigon was an unmitiga disaster, will need no reminder that, living wit unified, militant, heavily armed (its army outnum all the other armies of the region put together), eva lical Vietnam will be both difficult and dangerous.

Notes and References

1. The warning that negotiations would be used by North Vietnam to continue the war by other means was given repeatedly by senior defectors.

2. Robert F. Turner, *Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development* (Hoover Institution Press, 1975), p. 238.

3. Dr. J.F. Cairns, then deputy Prime Minister of Australia, was identified with this propaganda campaign through the International Committee for Peace and Disarmament, of which he was president. According to Mr. Romesh Chandra (*New Times*, No. 28, July 1975, p. 14) half the members of the Australian Labor Cabinet were members of the World Peace Council, which was most active in calling for full implementation of the Paris Agreement.

4. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Vietnams, A Political and Military Analysis* (Pall Mall Press, London), p. 113.

5. See "How Hanoi Sees the War", *Reporter* magazine, 10 August 1967, pp. 17-20.

6. Generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung, "A New Development of the Art of Leading a Revolutionary War", *Vietnam Courier*, August and September 1975, extracted from "Great Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising", published in the *Nhan Dan* and *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, 31 June and 1 July 1975.

7. *The Military Balance*, 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London).

8. General Van Tien Dung, "Some Problems in Combining nomic Development With the Consolidation of Na Defence", *Hoc Tap* and *Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan* December 1974 issues; and *Nhan Dan* and *Quan Doi Dan*, 17 December 1974.

9. Truong Chinh, *The August Revolution*, pp. 39-41.

10. Dr. Phan Quang Dan, *The Republic of Vietnam's En ment and People* (Saigon, 1975).

11. *Ibid.*

12. Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, Vo p. 896.

13. General Van Tien Dung, *op. cit.*

14. Denis Warner, *The Last Confucian* (Macmillan, New pp. 199-200.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

16. "How Hanoi Sees the War", *loc. cit.*, note 5.

17. *Vietnam Courier*, September 1975, p. 12.

18. *Vietnam Courier*, August 1975, p. 16.

CHINA: *Nationalist hopes for the future are based on a belief that the Communism of the Mainland will eventually "collapse under its own weight, and when this occurs the Republic will provide the alternative". A physical invasion of the Mainland is no longer mooted seriously. The Nationalists cling to the belief that "foreign systems", like Communism, when introduced into China are bound to succumb eventually to the "right way", as they have done in the dynastic past.*

The Future of Taiwan*

Thomas A. Marks

COMMENTING on the death of Chiang Kai-shek, the last of the World War II "Big Four" and the "near legendary" President of the Republic of China (ROC), an American official noted, "It is the passing of an era, a landmark event. But it will not make very much difference in the behaviour of anyone."(1) This phrase undoubtedly contains more truth than the flurry of speculation following the Generalissimo's death concerning possible implications for American and Chinese foreign policies. The nominal transition of power to Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, already completed in fact some time earlier, proceeded smoothly in Taiwan; the PRC mildly noted the death of a "traitor"(2); and for the United States the delicate and difficult dilemma of the ROC's unique status in international affairs relative to the People's Republic of China (PRC) continued to pose the same problems it had for more than two decades.

With the final collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces in 1949 and the relocation of Kuomintang government to Taiwan, the United States' China policy had obviously reached a crucial period. The years of effort expended in bolstering the Chinese in their struggle against the Japanese so that a viable, national pro-Western government could be able to emerge from the wartime turmoil all come to naught as the victorious Communists took control of the World's largest population. Attempting to accept this outcome as a matter of popular self-determination, President Harry S. Truman declared that the United States would provide no military aid or advice to the Nationalists(3). The stage was apparently set for the quick demise of Taiwan as the last real bastion of Kuomintang forces.

Yet little more than 20 years later, when President Richard Nixon and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai issued the historic Shanghai Communiqué effecting a re-establishment of liaison between America and the PRC after the long hiatus, the contents of the statement clearly indicated that the greatest issue standing in the way of a full reconciliation was the future of Taiwan. Against all odds the small remnant of the Republic of China had not only survived, but prospered and become a major issue in the foreign policies of two world Powers and their relations with each other. A solution to the "Taiwan question" has still not been found, nor does one appear imminent. Discussion of the issue has hinged primarily on how best to lower the American profile gracefully without ignoring the legitimate interests of the Chinese on Taiwan, while simultaneously remaining on the sidelines so that some solution may be worked out by the Chinese themselves.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the issue of Taiwan's future by presenting briefly the history of the current problem, the possible alternatives or directions, and finally an analysis of factors bearing on these alternatives. Primary emphasis will be placed upon the future of Taiwan from the point of view of the Chinese on Taiwan, who will hereafter in this work be referred to as the Nationalist Chinese, for in previous discussions this element appears to have been largely dismissed as but an irksome obstacle to a permanent solution. What indeed the feelings of the Nationalist Chinese are will be the single greatest factor militating for or against any proposed solution, for ultimately it will be these people who decide to tread a path of their own choosing or to resist a solution forced upon them by outside power.

* * * * * * *

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LOOKING first at the historical development of the issue, Taiwan was first settled by small groups of Chinese during the twelfth century A.D., but was under no real control of the imperial court. The Portuguese gave the island the name *Ilha Formosa,* beautiful island, and parts of Taiwan were briefly occupied by the Spaniards and the Dutch, the latter expelling the former in 1642 and being, in turn, forced to withdraw by the Chinese in 1662. Ceded to Japan under the treaty ending the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95(4), Taiwan strongly resisted Japanese occupation and two short-lived "republics" were proclaimed(5). After the initial uprisings were crushed, a degree of unrest continued throughout the 50-year Japanese tenure; but rather than manifestations of a continuing separatist sentiment as portrayed by some sources(6), this stirring was "a search for political means to achieve the goal of Formosan participation in island government at all levels, within the overall Japanese empire frame of reference"(7). The net effect of the Japanese presence, nevertheless, was to leave the island's economy and cultural level in an unprecedented state of advancement and prosperity.

Japanese defeat in World War II thrust the Taiwan issue into the international arena. The strategic debate regarding the relative priorities of Luzon and Taiwan as primary objectives had been resolved in favour of Luzon(8); and in 1945, as a result of discussions at both the Cairo and Yalta Conferences, Chiang Kai-shek's Government was allowed to take over the administration of Taiwan. While the legal transfer of sovereignty over the island to China had been promised by the Allies, this was not actually done. By the separate peace treaty concluded in the 1950s between Japan and the ROC, Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan. That sovereignty was not subsequently transferred to another Power, although the Nationalists obviously saw themselves as being implicitly named to accept the island.

Obviously this issue was never given serious thought in the immediate years after World War II, and it was only the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek which occasioned discussion of the matter. As noted earlier, the loss of the Mainland by the ROC forced upon the US, Chiang's principal supporter, a decision to accept the civil war's outcome. On 5 January 1950 President Truman made his declaration of US neutrality in the final settlement of the struggle. The outbreak of the Korean War completely changed this attitude, and on 27 June 1950 Truman put the US Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and resumed the aid which had been halted six months earlier. At that time the President stated that the seizure of Taiwan would "be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces"(9). Although the Nationalist Chinese offer of troops for action in Korea was declined, the Communist Chinese entry into the struggle in November 1 hardened the US attitude.

Thus began what seems to be the implemen tion of a US policy which, according to St Department official Thomas P. Shoesmith, had following objectives:

- Use of Taiwan as a possible base of operations, in the event of direct conflict with Mainland China, as a part of "containment", thus giving a special military strategic importance to the island;
- Supporting the ROC as a Chinese alternative to what 10 or 15 years ago was called the "Communist experiment" on the Mainland;
- Justification for denying international recognition to the PRC(10).

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IN THE years that followed, PRC actions in Taiwan Strait continued to cause US reacti and subsequent bad relations between the Powers. During the summer of 1954 the Commun stepped up military pressure against the offs islands controlled by the Nationalists, — the chens, Matsu, and Quemoy. The US response wa sign a mutual defence treaty with Taiwan o December 1954. An exchange of notes between US and the ROC on 10 December that same y formally bound Taiwan not to attack the Mainl without prior consultation with the US and clari that the provisions for mutual aid applied only the case of an external armed attack(11).

Further Communist attacks against the offs islands in November 1954 and January 1955 led US Congress to authorize President Truman, in Formosa Resolution, to use force to protect Taiw the Pescadores, and "related positions and ter ries". Subsequently the US Seventh Fleet hel evacuate 17,000 civilians and 25,000 troops from Tachens, which were then occupied by the M land. A massive shelling of the Quemoy Isla followed, but an invasion failed to materialize a the US massed a powerful fleet and declared intention to defend Taiwan. In 1962 the islands w again shelled, but since that time the Commun followed an every-other-day schedule, firing prima leaflet shells. (On the occasion of its 25th. Anni sary celebrations in 1974 Peking announced indefinite suspension of all shelling).

The ROC still controls Taiwan, the Pescad Quemoy, and Matsu. The small island of Tiao Tai, to the North-east of Taiwan, with a pote for oil, is claimed by both the ROC and PR

verted to Japan under the terms of the US-Japanese eaty returning Okinawa to Japanese administra- n(12).

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FOR its part Taiwan did not sit idly by while the Communists seized the initiative. From 50 maritime raids were conducted against the ainland, as well as extensive reconnaissance, pro- ganda, subversion, and sabotage missions(13). The , though, heavily involved in Vietnam, had no sire to see such provocations going on and publicly avowed support for all such operations, with the ception of reconnaissance(14). In this latter form operation the US participated directly, the mmunists claiming to have shot down 19 Ameri- reconnaissance drones between 1964 and 70(15).

Despite the extensive history of hostility, the US d PRC gradually moved towards reconciliation. In vember 1969 the US terminated regular naval rols of the Taiwan Strait, but it was the dramatic xon-Kissinger moves, leading to President Nixon's t to Peking, which paved the way for a significant ft in US attitudes. On 21 September 1971 the nate Foreign Relations Committee recommended repeal of the Formosa Resolution, but a vote to t effect was defeated in 1972 after heavy lobbying both sides. Ultimately, in 1974, the Resolution was ealed.

Simultaneously, with the shift in American itude was a resolution of the problem of China's ited Nations representation in favour of the PRC. the US hedged its stand, the UN voted on 25 tober 1971 to admit the PRC and exclude the C. The vote, while perhaps inevitable, in many ys reflected the shift of the US position, for etofore firm supporters of the ROC wavered hout positive leadership. In the aftermath of the ision, the US position supporting the ROC ame more difficult, for the ROC rapidly lost port as a whole multitude of nations broke tions and recognized the PRC. By mid-1975 only nations recognized the ROC. Thus Taiwan found lf increasingly isolated, with only the US as a firm ough questionable supporter, even Japan having ered diplomatic relations.

1975 also witnessed the collapse of both the mer Republic and the Republic of Vietnam, owed by the co-opting of the Laotian coalition vernment by the Communists. In the shuffle of ligning priorities in South-east Asia, such important i-Communist states as the Philippines and Thailand diplomatic ties with Taipei in favour of Peking. at proved most disturbing to the Nationalist Chinese his chain of events was not merely the occurrences nselves, but more crucially the manner in which a US lack of resolve appeared to contribute directly to the result. The extent to which the American Congress appeared to "abandon" Phnom Penh and Saigon cast grave doubts upon the validity of the US commitment to defend Taiwan in similar circumstances.

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WITH the shift of US attitude detailed above and the growing trends leading toward American eventual recognition of the PRC, Taiwan is faced with a questionable future. Having examined briefly the historical dimensions of the Taiwan question, a number of possible options may now be proposed and subjected to scrutiny. These are:

- Continue in the present configuration, with the PRC controlling the Mainland, and the ROC controlling only Taiwan and the offshore islands but claiming to be the legitimate ruler of all China;
- One unified China, with Taiwan rejoining the PRC as an integral part of the Mainland;
- One China, with Taiwan as an autonomous province, yielding its control of foreign policy, defence, and general policy guidance to the PRC, yet maintaining its unique economic position; and
- One China, one Taiwan: i.e., the ROC renouncing its claim to rule the Mainland and declaring itself to be an independent Chinese state as is Singapore.

Considering first the alternative of maintaining the *status quo*, trends in this direction have in the past centered around Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whose personal steadfastness of belief, political organization and indoctrination methods, strong appeal to those who wanted to continue the Chinese cultural tradition, success in building a viable economic base, and building and maintaining of a strong military establishment all contributed to the continuing separation of the ROC from the PRC. Chiang and his followers, including his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, established a path toward what many others consider to be unattainable or unrealistic goals. Chiang's legacy, as managed by his son as his successor, will most likely continue this trend toward *status quo*. Cohesiveness, caused by a strong anti-Communist indoctrination effort, added to education in the Kuomintang ideology of "The Three People's Principles" (as expanded and explained by recent KMT leaders) and the reputation that the KMT is concerned with preserving Chinese tradition, are powerful factors which contribute to the trend. Many of these factors are even relatively influential on

many indigenous Taiwanese, who are usually concerned with the Mainland tradition.

The standard of living of all people on Taiwan, especially indigenous Taiwanese, has improved at such a rapid rate that most of the causes utilized elsewhere by Communist cadres to subvert from within are pre-empted; there is little danger of a strong Communist movement developing within Taiwan. Politically, the KMT has taken steps to appease those Taiwanese who are concerned that they do not have enough voice in governing Taiwan. A native Taiwanese Governor was appointed for the first time in May 1971, and the high central government posts of Deputy Premier and Minister of Communications were given to Taiwanese. Three Taiwanese were appointed as judges at the national level in 1972. Coupled with the election of increasing numbers of Taiwanese at the local village and county government levels, these appointments have partially satisfied many Taiwanese who were concerned with adequate representation. If these measures had not been taken, many middle-of-the-road Taiwanese might have been attracted to a more militant Taiwanese Independence Movement. Now they seem content to hope for an evolutionary and peaceful takeover of the Government in Taiwan. Probably their view is shared by a younger generation — up to about 35 years of age — of "Mainlanders", who were born on Taiwan, speak Taiwanese, and do not remember much about the Mainland. These groups appear content to maintain the *status quo* until they are in commanding political, economic, and military positions, — perhaps another 25 years.

In sum, a combination of the political system established by Chiang Kai-shek, unwillingness of the ROC side to compromise with the PRC political, economic, and social systems, and an inherent resistance to radical change by people who are not hungry or whose expectations have not risen too fast, are powerful factors toward continuing the current trend toward the *status quo*.

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LET US turn to the next alternative of a unified China. The PRC has steadfastly maintained its determination to "liberate" Taiwan, feeling this would have been accomplished long ago had it not been for American "imperialist" intervention. During the period of direct confrontation with the US the PRC loudly proclaimed its goal of incorporating Taiwan within the Communist national framework(16); but as PRC foreign policy became more sophisticated, and the Communists sensed that the balance of world sympathy in the propaganda battle seemed to have shifted to their side of the issue, more moderation was evident. The latest evidence of this shift was the 19 March 1975 release by Peking of 293 "war criminals" held since the Communist ascent to power. The released prisoners were granted rights of citizens and told they would be given visas to Taiwan if they so desired(17).

The late Chou En-lai stated that in the e of a reconciliation Taiwan would have some form autonomous status and there would be no retalia taken against the Taiwan Chinese. He also n that the Taiwan people's lives would improve, s their incomes would be the same, but they would under such beneficial PRC laws as no natio income tax. People who desired could return to t home provinces "without discrimination". On 21 1971 Chou stated, "If Taiwan returns to motherland, then its people would be makin contribution to the motherland for which we sh give them a reward. Far from exacting revenge them, we will reward them."(18)

Such offers must naturally be examined s what sceptically in the light of certain basic f When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeking to gain power, it promised land to farm This was given, but then taken back. Similarly, f time following 1950, businessmen in Shanghai allowed to maintain capitalism, this concession b eliminated when the CCP saw fit. The reaso behind these moves, outlined in detail in Mao's Contradictions", could also be applied to Ta following absorption. As for the matter of no inc tax, it need only be mentioned that an income t only meaningful in terms of capitalist income. socialist state, government-controlled salaries are functional equivalent of an income tax.

Further, with the outcome of Peking's cu leadership upheaval still unclear, a moderate line as Chou's may become defunct, although this is unl to occur in the near future, whichever faction em victorious on the Mainland. Internal considera centred on building a new society are more pre than involvement in what would surely be a c venture if forced into the military sphere.

For its part, the ROC Government does accept what it sees as blatant attempts to lur people into submission by a strategic versio united front tactics(19). The present situation the KMT leadership but a temporary setback in struggle begun by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, revered by sides as having liberated China from the des feudalism of the corrupt Manchu dynasty, to giv Chinese a free life under his Three Principles o People: nationalism, democracy, and the pe welfare(20). (The CCP is more selective in invoking of the Three People's Principles.) Ne autonomy within the larger Communist system, independence as a separate nation, is acceptab the KMT leadership and a large proportion o followers, for to choose such courses would b renounce the very foundations upon which

public of China was founded, — i.e. that the ssings inherent in Sun's principles should be ended to the whole of the Chinese people.

The depth to which this feeling has been ulcated into the psyche of the average Nationalist inese has been greatly underestimated; foreign ervers tend to pass it off as but a figment of vernment officials' imaginations. Discussions with ividuals spanning the social spectrum, from the mmandant of the special Warfare School to p clerks, evoke exclamations of sadness at the eigners' inability to comprehend what is to them a st basic Chinese emotion — that of cultural darity, whereby none will be left under the atural yoke of Communism. When questioned cerning the present overwhelming dominance of PRC, the reaction is typically to cite analagous ations in Chinese history where a small state or up has overcome all obstacles, or to quote verbs such as "Human effort can achieve anyng". The responses are not rehearsed, but ier manifestations of a state of mind completely que and perhaps peculiar to those Asian nations ing an immensely long history of cultural homoeity seldom shared in other parts of the world.

It is precisely this issue of depth of feeling ch, as stated initially, has been largely ignored, which stands as one of the greatest factors ring upon resolution of the Taiwan question. e consolidating their power on the Mainland, the mmunists' priority national interest has been to rn China to its rightful place as the "Centre of World" or the "Middle Kingdom". In other ds, after a long period of national humiliation, na demands respect from other nations as at least equal and in some cases as a superior. To achieve national interest Mao set up three goals: to te a "New Maoist man" (sociological); to build a erful, prosperous and well-fed nation (economic); to establish a viable, efficient, and internationalspected Government (political). China in the underwent profound changes resulting from its narchs' schemes, yet whereas in the past China not just a country or a nation-state but a ization from which answers and continuity could lrawn, Mao seems intent upon changing this and ding a nation-state "at the expense of the ization, cultural heritage, and traditions"(21).

Implementing this approach has led to methods ideology which are anathema to the Nationalist ese. The revolutionary thrust of PRC foreign cy is seen as the paranoid reaction of a atorship unsure of its own people; but it is the of the quality of life in the PRC, or at least the onalist Chinese view of it, which evokes the most ed emotions from Taiwan inhabitants. Even rvers most sympathetic to the PRC readily admit finding the precise path to the creation of a new society has been a chaotic process, as exemplified in the numerous internal campaigns culminating in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution(22). Nationalist Chinese attribute such events not to planned, "continuing revolution" but to the ultimate fact that Communism is against human nature. Continued turmoil represents the writhing of an oppressed people struggling to resist an alien ideology. That fellow Chinese are perceived to be undergoing such trials is a matter of individual concern within the Republic and further reinforces the determination to accept no solution short of one day returning to the Mainland.

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NATIONALIST calls for returning to the Mainland are often misinterpreted. While still official policy the ultimate aim of returning to the Mainland has undergone an evolution and is no longer seen as coming about by armed invasion. Rather, the Nationalist Chinese feel time is on their side in the battle against a system fundamentally wrong and in violation of the principles of heaven and natural order. Ultimately, Communism must collapse under its own weight, and when this occurs the Republic will provide the alternative. Lest such a view seem overly unrealistic in light of the current situation, it must be remembered that the Nationalist Chinese are not viewing "the future" in the Western sense of "the next 20 years". It is difficult for the uninitiated to appreciate what it is to see oneself as the cultural heir to thousands of years of history. Since more than 2,000 years before Christ, the Chinese nation and its culture have remained essentially intact aside from periods of dynastic strife. Dynasties lasting hundreds of years have disappeared with what at the time were certainly roars, but which in the seemingly infinite span of Chinese history were but whispers. All invaders and foreign systems have eventually succumbed to the "right way". That Communism will do likewise is not doubted.

Embodying this feeling is the motto, found on prominent display throughout Taiwan, Wu Wang Tsai Chu, — "Do not forget you are in Chu". This statement refers to an incident during the Warring States period from which the Nationalists have drawn inspiration. In the fighting for control of northeastern China, the state of Yen conquered all of Ch'i save for three cities, one of which was Chu. To this stronghold the Ch'i monarch fled, there to rally his forces and in the end defeat the enemy and recover his kingdom. In the aftermath of his victory, the Ch'i king exorted his subjects never to forget the lesson learned at Chu(23).

In the struggle of proving which alternative system has greater merit, that of the ROC or PRC, the Nationalist Chinese see one of their most potent

weapons as letting outsiders see life as it exists in Taiwan. It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt a comparison of PRC and ROC lifestyles, a task in which impartial analysis cannot be made as long as only limited access to the PRC is allowed. However, as set forth in the introductory comments, the perceptions of the Nationalist Chinese when comparing their lot to that of their Mainland brothers is a factor which needs be explored. For this reason some analysis of life in Taiwan itself is necessary to illustrate the foundation upon which cognitive judgements of the Mainland are built.

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THE political systems of the ROC and the PRC do not differ much in structure. Both are authoritarian, supported by an efficient party mechanism and strong military organization that is controlled by the party. A common practice is to place the ROC in the same class as other petty dictatorships which mouth platitudes of freedom while suppressing their people. The KMT cannot be so simply labelled, for its leaders have generally learned hard lessons from the loss of the Mainland and built a very real national consensus on both the overall orientation of society and desired nature of lifestyle. The Nationalist Chinese system of government, in which the entire nation is represented at the expense of the interests of Taiwan Province alone, has been discussed as a measure whereby the Mainland Chinese can continue to control the Taiwanese majority. It must also be considered, however, given the earlier analysis of Nationalist Chinese aspirations to return to the Mainland, that to have any other governmental structure would be to admit the unreality of the dream. Neither the Government nor its supporters appear yet willing to do this.

Within this framework, then, legislative elections are held which provide the members of a five-power system made up of five *yuan* (councils), — Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination, and Control — governing in a fashion similar to a parliamentary democracy. Individual freedoms are very much in evidence, as perhaps best capsulized in the universal answer and look of amazement given to a foreigner asking the "Can you do this?" question: "Of course, this is *free* China." Dissenters are at present dealt with in the same manner as in other enlightened political systems where dissent is tolerated as long as criticisms are channelled within the boundaries dictated by law and the regime.

This is not to deny that injustices have in the past occurred. The hypersensitivity of officials to Communist infiltration and subversion has led to arrests, exile, and imprisonment for reasons unjustifiable in a nation claiming to be a democracy. That such have occurred is unquestioned, but appear to have been a product of Taiwan's own uncerta and fear for its integrity as opposed to a premedi ed plan to stifle opposition. The prospering Taiwan has caused the fear that the people's mi may become tainted almost to disappear, and wit apparently have gone the excesses which brou "police state" accusations. Officials are watchful, the KMT still considers itself "at war", but normal lifestyle is not radically different in orie tion from that of any Western industrial democr Most important, the people consider themselves and are quite verbal in proclaiming such.

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MUCH of the credit for the growing enligh ment of Nationalist Chinese society must g the booming economy. A capitalist system with economy second only to Japan in East Asia(Taiwan has used a combination of trade and I industrial development(25) to build a standard living unmatched in most of the countries in area, particularly the PRC. Judicious land ref under a "land to the tillers" programme, a suc story frequently ignored, has eliminated the prob of landlordism, and the army helps the far gather their harvests to offset the labour short brought on by increasing urbanization.

Through Government information services people are made aware of the disparity between lifestyle and that of the Chinese living u Communism. The West in particular has genuinely impressed by the PRC's achievemen moulding a system capable of eliminating the ag Mainland problems of hunger, disease, and ineq but the Nationalist Chinese feel that due to war a host of other factors, Chiang Kai-shek's Go ment never had a real chance to implement system now a reality on Taiwan.

Further solidifying Nationalist Chinese atti is the feeling that on Taiwan they are the heirs last preservers of the cultural traditions of Chi history. The savage attacks in the PRC on everyt from love to Confucius(26) are seen as self-defea in that they increasingly turn the Communists a from the natural order and thereby increase internal strains within their system.

Attempts to make Mao Tse-tung the sourc all moral righteousness(27) are particularly re nant, despite the superficial resemblance betwee cults of Mao and Chiang Kai-shek. The gra de-emphasizing of the ostentacious public ador of Chiang in the years prior to his death acco nied the growing confidence felt by the Natio Chinese in their ability to face the future as a v entity. The Generalissimo, while revered as the responsible for the social and economic "mir which was Taiwan, passed quietly from the s

d was succeeded by Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang d become Premier in early 1972 and built up a ass following of sorts by spending time amongst the ople and performing his functions competently.

Summarizing, the central force behind the vement toward accommodation has come from PRC. Yet as detailed above, the Nationalist ceptions of their lifestyle and freedom as opposed that of the Mainland has precluded a response on ir part. The indoctrination present in both the C and ROC is so intense that it creates sincere tionalists" in both areas, determined to dedicate ir lives to reunification of Taiwan and the inland — and to impose their "correct" political l economic system on the other side. As the ision-makers change on either side, or as the rld environment changes, such nationalists could n control and give higher priority to immediate nification.

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THE third option, that of Taiwan remaining autonomous within the PRC, has frequently been anced in an academic context. Maintenance of sort of unique economic position is contrary to CCP ideology, although some precedent is vided by the continued existence of Hong Kong l Macao. Macao, while under nominal Portuguese ereignty, has been effectively controlled by the nmunists since 1966; and when the leftist military ime of Portugal offered to return the colony, the C declined to accept it(28). Similarly, Hong g, although under firm British control, relies on PRC for its food and water. Both enclaves are cially considered by the Communists already to be part of the PRC, current treaties notwithstand- (29). Peking is not willing at present to grapple h the myriad problems which would ensue in mpting to absorb these greatly different societies its own — problems which would be no less ficult where Taiwan is concerned. Ultimately, ugh, regardless of the reasons for Macao and g Kong's continued colonial status, it does not n likely that the PRC would indefinitely tolerate existence of an aberration such as Taiwan within socialist framework.

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FINALLY, there is the direction towards independence. "Independent Taiwan", as used in paper, is not restricted to the current Taiwan ependence Movement and its ultimate success, refers to any circumstance under which Taiwan ld abandon reunification as a goal and seek a tically independent status in world affairs. The lership could be Taiwanese, Mainlander, or a bination of the two, not merely "Taiwan for the wanese". The factor contributing most to Taiwan's independence is socio-cultural. The PRC and ROC systems seem to be diverging rapidly. The PRC has attempted to reduce the influence of the cultural tradition, while the ROC has attempted to strengthen it and make it fit into the modern world.

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THE Taiwanese-Mainlander conflict on Taiwan still remains, with Taiwanese resenting Mainlander elitist attitudes and feeling that they differ from the Mainlanders by language and customs. The constant talk of the native Taiwanese hating the Mainlanders, of the "old guard" on Taiwan preferring a united China under Communism to an independent Taiwan, and similar assertions, have been exaggerated and based largely upon analysis of Taiwan as it perhaps was in the past rather than how it is now. This issue has received a fair amount of publicity due to the activities of the Taiwan Independence Movement, which culminated in the attempted assassination of Chiang Ching-kuo during a 10-day visit to the US(30), and the disparities in the political opportunities of Taiwanese and Mainlanders.

All arguments concerning this issue and its ramifications hinge upon the initial assumption that the Chinese and Taiwanese are two different ethnic groups existing in an essentially bi-racial/ethnic society, and that each has its own unique ideas of goal actualization and so forth. This line of thought began with the widespread anti-Government Taiwanese riots which occurred as the Nationalists took control of the island after the Japanese defeat. The riots' suppression left some 10,000 to 20,000 Taiwanese dead(31). Although the cause of the disturbances is now generally accepted by most China experts to have had more to do with administrative mismanagement and individual cases of official dishonesty rather than any racial reasons, the implication had taken root. As the years have passed, supporting evidence for discrimination charges has been easily found in statistics such as the fact that 95% of the ROC Army draftees are Taiwanese while only a small percentage of the high-ranking officers are non-Mainland Chinese. There are indications, though, that the differences which exist are principally a product of a multitude of factors other than race, — governmental structure, demography, economics, cultural differences, and so on.

Taiwanese comprise 87% of the 15.6 million population and are concentrated overwhelmingly in the rural sectors(32). In contrast nearly 60% of the Mainlanders, who, with the exception of some 500,000 troops, were already well-educated and business-oriented when they came to Taiwan, are urban dwellers. Mainlanders hold an educational advantage, with 22% of secondary school and 39%

of university enrolments(33), but these figures are certainly no departure from the pattern of urban student dominance experienced in other Asian nations where universities are concentrated in the major cities.

The superimposition of national government upon provincial administration means that most officials of the ROC national Government are Mainlanders, often representing their "home" provinces. Delegates elected in the initial November 1947 election have continued in office by Presidential decree, while "alternate delegates have been qualified by the National Assembly to fill vacancies from some constituencies because of the toll of age or mortality"(34). Taiwanese dominate provincial, county, and city government positions. Social and military institutions are also dominated by Taiwanese(35), although Mainlanders have a considerable edge in the upper echelons. As time passes, however, and education becomes more widespread, this should change. Avenues for advancement are certainly not closed to anyone of ability, and the Taiwanese have near-control of the commercial world. As Taiwan increasingly becomes an urban, consumer-oriented society, it is to be expected that Taiwanese job placement will reflect their increasing shift from the rural areas.

Concerning the purported attitude and goal differences between Chinese and Taiwanese, Western academic surveys have shown consistently that the two groups' attitudes are remarkably similar, with terminal values selected being the same, aside from slight differences in ordering(36). While each body prefers its own social group, the distinction is based primarily on lifestyle, not ethnicity, for both bodies see themselves as Chinese. There is no overt hostility between the two groups, although underlying dissatisfactions mentioned earlier remain. Both express satisfaction at their ability to make progress on the "ladder of life". Individual cases of conflict hinge in nearly all cases upon socio-economic differences stemming from factors far more complex than ethnic antagonism. Concluding his survey comparing Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese children's attitudes, one source correctly summarized the results corroborated by all such work: "...the general overall similarity (in responses) between Mainlander and Taiwanese children, with regard to both politically relevant and specifically political attitudes, is quite marked and of sufficient strength to suggest that the Mainlander and Taiwanese groups have both continued to adhere closely to similar political-cultural norms despite their separation during the first half of the century."(37)

That there are segments of the Taiwanese and Chinese populations unhappy with the regime is not a matter of doubt, yet analysts have shown a disturbing tendency to attribute to movements such as the Taiwan Independence Movement far m support than they in reality experience. Far f being the tip of an iceberg, they represent isol manifestations of small group desires. This is nc belittle the goals of such organizations, but t sentiments are not in tune with the feelings of people whom they claim to represent. Peng Ming-i one of the leaders of the Taiwan Independ Movement, stated in 1971:

> "Any settlement of the sovereignty over Formosa must come through peaceful negotiations in which the people of Formosa are fully and effectively represented. No one outside may dictate to Formosa to whom they should belong. Neither Peking nor Washington can speak for them. The present regime in Taipei never has spoken legitimately for the majority on Formosa. It cannot do so unless it undergoes a basic structural change and the Formosan majority is represented effectively at every level."(38)

That the Taiwanese do not see themselve isolated from the political or social mainstre suppressed, or even as a group radically apart f the "present regime" of Taiwan has been a illustrated by social science literature discussed lier. While there is certainly no foolproof wa gauge precisely the extent of hidden, unic Taiwanese, long-range aspirations concerning island's future, the trend caused by the isl increasing diplomatic isolation and economic pr rity has been to solidify all parties in a com front.

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BOTH ROC and PRC Governments have licly denounced the Taiwan Independ Movement and see it as supported and finance outside Powers such as the United States Japan(39). While groups advocating independ have been strongly supported by some segment the US academic community, US officials avoided supporting these advocates. Some Gov ment officials agree with colleagues in the acad community that an independent Taiwan would b "easy way out" to solve many US-China probl but they also realize the risks and the prac difficulties of implementation. One major prac difficulty is that the PRC is likely to react strong US support of an independent Taiwan, since PRC's long range goal is reunification.

This matter provides a convenient poin departure for a fuller discussion of the role ou Powers actually do play in the problem of Taiw future. Much of the PRC's policy towards Taiwan been a product of its overwhelming fear of enci

ent by its enemies(40). American and Soviet moves re all seen as part of a great Power plot to isolate e PRC(41), with Taiwan but an imperialist base ving to close the ring. While direct confrontation tween the US and China was a real possibility ring the Vietnam War, and a large number of nerican servicemen supporting the war were sta- ned on Taiwan, the need to do something about iwan was considered by the Communists to be rriding. As such the American abandonment of commitments to the ROC was a constant ndition set forth for normalization of Peking-Wa- ngton relations once détente set in. As fears of an minent attack by either the USSR or the US sided, the need for immediate resolution of the blem subsided correspondingly.

In the meantime efforts have continued to cut iwan off from its one major source of support, the . The Nationalist Chinese, while grateful for nerican backing, are quite suspicious of US motives d fearful lest they be sacrificed in return for better ations with the PRC. The perceived American willingness to take more than passive measures as lo-China fell has reinforced this attitude. Coupled h President Gerald Ford's trip to Peking, the effect been to create an atmosphere of extreme wariness. iang Ching-kuo has stepped up his public pro- ncements warning the US of the pitfalls involved in rificing principles for short-term "accommodations" h the PRC(42).

Similarly, the ROC was originally quite worried the snowball effect created by its ouster from the and the Communist takeover in Indo-China leave it ally alone, an unacceptable situation for a mercantile ion. As the situation has developed, commercial ties e generally continued untouched even after diplo- tic rupture. Taiwan's valuable links with the erseas Chinese business communities in South-east a and elsewhere have remained strong, and the ROC now adjusted to the realities of inevitable isolation, epting the breaking of diplomatic relations stoically without a great deal of concern.

Recognizing that their association with the e World" has made them suspect as a US client thus the underdog in the propaganda war with Mainland, the Nationalists have done their best display independence and build a reservoir of d will among Third World nations, while at the e time counteracting wherever possible Commu- influence. American economic assistance up to and uding 1969 totalled US$2.3 billion(43), and Tai- 's present economic self-sufficiency has allowed the ning of foreign experts in the ROC and the sending chnical teams to nations in Africa and South-east , as well as to Saudi Arabia, the Dominican ublic, and Brazil(44). Information on military tance remains largely classified, but programmes such as the training of military personnel from Singapore(45) are designed to maximize Nationalist influence in key areas. In a similar undertaking Taiwan provided a military assistance mission on its own initiative to the Republic of Vietnam from 1964 until the final American withdrawal(46). More overt moves, such as the desire to provide combat troops in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, have been prevented by US insistence and pressure.

The impression of a lack of American resolve has created pressures for more military self-sufficiency. The ROC armed forces are already powerful enough to make any outright invasion attempt a costly proposition. A spate of reports over the previous year has credited the ROC with developing a nuclear weapon and delivery system(47). Such claims are not subject to definite verification, but it is doubtful that even their rectitude would change the basic facets of the Taiwan issue. What would be altered would be the ROC's ability to use military forces in the form of a nuclear retaliatory threat as a safeguard for independence, should that route be chosen.

While becoming increasingly resigned to the inevitability of US recognition of the PRC, the precise implications of this move are as puzzling to Taiwan as they are to Americans themselves. The US is quite naturally caught between the desire to normalize relations with a Government ruling one fifth of the world's population and the imperative necessity not to sell out a loyal ally whose nature is far superior qualitatively than many of America's recent associates. Japan, Taiwan's second trade partner behind the US, also has no desire to see a fellow industrial capitalist state destroyed. For both of these Powers the maintenance of the *status quo* creates difficulties which could conceivably be solved by an independent Taiwan. America and Japan remain key associates. Although there has been some speculation on the matter, there appears to be small chance of the ROC's turning towards another major Power, such-as the Soviet Union, even if faced with noncommittal stances by either Washington or Tokyo.

Summarizing the previous discussion of the originally outlined four options, the two principal parties involved, the PRC and ROC, are both in favour of one China, but have quite different ideas of what this would entail. On Taiwan there remains at least publicly a governmental consensus to one day return to the Mainland. Of great significance in discussing this point is the fact that returning does not connote armed invasion and is not framed within a fixed time schedule. The deep-rooted antipathy towards the Communist system as being against the nature of mankind and destructive of the natural order would prevent any sort of reconciliation within the PRC framework unless some sort of drastic reversal of ROC economic fortunes served to relegate ideals to a lesser position. There is no widespread

sentiment at present in either the PRC or ROC for an independent Taiwan, although this option could conceivably be considered at a later date by ROC adherents if it was perceived as the only means available for national survival and preservation of Chinese culture.

In the final analysis Taiwan will determine its own fate, for the will of the people on the island will provide the final veto on any solution. Overwhelming force could be used, but any forced solution w be costly indeed to the PRC both morally physically. Even in the event of total isola feeling runs strong in the ROC in favou continuing towards the dream. For as one co student noted in a letter, "Relying upon ones better than relying upon others. We believe so. only cease struggling for our principle when we unable to do so. We will not give up hoping."(48).

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BURMA: *For many years Chinese foreign policy towards Burma has been contradictory. While en couraging Government-to-Government relations at one leve Peking has aided and abetted the While Flag insurgents a another. Paradoxically though, since the Communists' suc cess in Vietnam, the Burmese Communist insurgents hav suffered serious reverses. This is probably partly due to lessening in PRC support.*

Sino-Burmese Relations post-Vietnam

Edwin W. Martin

IN VIEW of the widespread expectation that the Communist triumph in Indo-China would enhance the threat of Communist insurgency throughout the remainder of South-east Asia, it is noteworthy that during the past year the fortunes of the Communist insurgents in Burma have ebbed while State relations between China and Burma have improved. The insurgents suffered serious defeats in the Irrawaddy Delta and Pegu Yoma areas of Burma in the spring of 1975 resulting in the deaths of their leaders, Thakin Zin and Thakin Chit(1). Moreover, their military drives in eastern Burma failed to achieve any appreciable success, in contrast to their accomplishments in this region during the previous three or four years. This failure appears to have been due in part to a reduction in material support received from China.

For more than two and a half decades the Governments of Burma and China have maintained diplomatic relations on the one hand, while the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Burmese Communist Party (BCP — also known as the White Flag Communists) have maintained close fraternal relations on the other. In fact, Peking has seen fit to carry this apparent contradiction in Chinese policy even further by providing economic aid to the Burmese Government while at the same time providing other kinds of assistance to the BCP insurgents.

This state of affairs was strikingly illustrated by the Rangoon newspaper, *The Working People's Daily,* in its issue of 26 March 1974, by juxtaposing two of the major stories on its front page. One story was headlined, "Symbol of Burma-China peaceful cooperation/Takaw bridge across Salween dedicated"; it described the "dedication ceremony of the Takaw Bridge in Kunhing Township, Southern Shan State, built under the Chinese-Burmese Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement". The other story, headlined "BCPs suff heavily in the east", began: "The foreign assisted bord insurgents under the banner of the 'BCP' who we driven towards the border from Mong Yang and Mo Ma Region by the government troops...recen resumed subversive activities in Mong Yu region Mong Yawng Township". Typically, this news item d not directly identify either the border or the source the foreign assistance, but in the lower right-ha corner of the front page was a map showing the line retreat of the BCP insurgents toward the clearly mark China-Burma border(2).

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PEKING'S dual approach to relations with Burm illustrated by these stories continues, but sin 1975 its emphasis seems to have been increasingly State relations. A number of high-level visits took pla during that year. In August Burmese Foreign Minis U Hla Phone visited Peking and in December Chine Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang came to Rangoon f trade talks. A Burmese economic/industrial delegati went to China in autumn. Of special importance, course, was President U Ne Win's "friendly official vis in November.

At the "grand welcoming banquet" for hi President Ne Win stressed the Burmese Governmen desire to maintain friendly relations with Peking. "It of vital importance", he declared, "that our two sid should make every effort to consolidate and mainta the friendly relations (between Burma and China)... ...differences arise between our two countries, should resolve them with patience, mutual understan ing and accommodation, always determined that o friendship must prevail."(3) Judging by the cordiality Ne Win's reception in Peking, where he held talks wi

Chairman Mao as well as with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, and by the tone of the Joint Communiqué issued at the conclusion of his visit, the Chinese also believe that "friendship must prevail".

The Communiqué highlighted the record of Sino-Burmese co-operation in the past. It recalled that Burma and China had "initiated" the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in 1954 and that the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty of October 1960 had "set a good example" in the settlement of international disputes. Although it did not mention specifically the Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression of January 1960 (lending credence to speculation that this treaty had been deliberately allowed to lapse by the Burmese Government at the end of ten years), the Communiqué used language reminiscent of the good will expressed in that treaty(4). Indeed, President Ne Win's visit seemed to bring Sino-Burmese State relations to a peak of goodwill not experienced since the Cultural Revolution in China put a severe chill on them.

* * * * * * *

WITHIN the context of its basic policy of "positive neutrality"(5), Burma has generally leaned over backwards to be friendly to Peking. It was the first non-Communist country in the world to recognize the People's Republic of China. Although Burma supported the United Nations Security Council resolution of 27 June 1950 on the Korean War, with the subsequent intrusion of Chinese troops into the conflict, its position changed. It voted against an American-sponsored resolution branding China as an aggressor in Korea and worked with an Arab-Asian group in the United Nations for a compromise resolution.

Unable to cope with thousands of Chinese Nationalist troops that fled into Burma from China in 1949-50, the Burmese Government took the matter to the United Nations in March 1953. While it was unsuccessful in having Nationalist China branded as an aggressor, Burma did succeed in having a resolution passed in April which condemned all foreign forces in Burma and demanded that they surrender their arms and either leave the country or be interned according to international law. In implementation of this resolution a four-nation United Nations' supervisory commission was formed to oversee the evacuation of the "foreign forces", and by mid-1954 some 6,000 persons had been evacuated to Taiwan. Because of its suspicion of American support for the Chinese Nationalist troops, the Burmese Government requested the United States to terminate its economic aid programme in Burma. These moves against Nationalist China and the United States were, of course, pleasing to Peking.

Sino-Burmese relations reached new levels of cordiality in 1960 with the signing of the Friendship and Boundary Treaties. Article II of the Friendship Treaty pledged that "There shall be everlasting peace and cordial friendship between the Contracting Parties who undertake to settle all disputes between them by means of peaceful negotiation". The Boundary Treaty represented the implementation of this pledge. It settled border disputes that had rankled Sino-Burmese relations for generations. At the time Peking made much of its successful diplomatic negotiations with Burma, holding up the Boundary Treaty as proof that China was able to resolve territorial problems with countries having different social systems.

Meanwhile the problem of the Chinese Nationalist troops remaining in Burma continued to plague Rangoon. Although some 4,200 of these troops and their dependents were evacuated by the United Nations in early 1961, the Burmese and Chinese Governments declared that they were prepared to act together to solve the problem. In a joint statement in Peking in April 1961 the Prime Ministers of the two countries declared that Burma and China would "when necessary, act in co-ordination and co-operation to solve" the issue of the "remnant Kuomintang troops in Burma".(6)

To what extent this pledge of Sino-Burmese co-operation was implemented is not clear(7), but the first half of the 1960s was a period when Peking laid stress on good relations with the Burmese Government. Chinese leaders visited Burma with considerable frequency and were full of praise for Burma's foreign policy. For example, the Joint Communiqué issued on 18 February 1964 on the occasion of Premier Chou En-lai's visit stated that the "Chinese side...reaffirmed its full respect for and support to [*sic*] the policy of peace and neutrality pursued by the Government of the Union of Burma in international affairs, which greatly contributes to the promotion of Asian-African solidarity and the maintenance of peace in Asia and the world."(8)

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THE smooth course of Sino-Burmese State relations was disrupted in mid-1967. Inspired by the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Chinese students wearing Mao buttons demonstrated in Rangoon in defiance of a Burmese Government order. Anti-Chinese riots ensued, resulting in the death of a Chinese aid official and of several Overseas Chinese. In response Peking withdrew its ambassador from Rangoon, and in October the Burmese Government requested the withdrawal of the Chinese economic aid mission. Meanwhile the Chinese radio and Press began to make vituperative attacks on the Burmese Government and to openly support the BCP insurgency. The Burmese leader were called "running dogs", "lackeys of imperialism" and "brutal fascists". *Peking Review* regularly printed reports of victories of the "people's forces" over the "reactionary Ne Win clique"(9).

As relations between China and Burma on the Government-to-Government level cooled, relations on

the Party level expanded. Until the mid-1960s the BCP had its principal bases in the Pegu Yomas in the Burmese heartland and its membership was composed primarily of ethnic Burmans. However, following the collapse of peace negotiations between the Government and the BCP and other insurgents in November 1963, Government forces conducted an intensified military campaign against the insurgents during which they succeeded in largely destroying BCP bases in the Pegu Yomas. On top of this military set-back, the BCP was rent by factionalism and decimated by purges. In 1968 its prestigious leader, Thakin Than Tun, was assassinated.

In the wake of these disasters Chinese influence over the BCP grew markedly. Returnees from China gained control of the BCP Politburo(10). Thakin Ba Thein Tin, long a resident of Peking, became Party Vice Chairman. The BCP's main base area was shifted to the borders of China. Its fighting forces were reconstituted from among the hill peoples who live on both sides of the Sino-Burmese border. A "North-east command" was set up under Naw Seng, a Kachin who had defected to the BCP in the early 1950s and who had subsequently lived and trained in China.

As the Cultural Revolution waned in China, the Burmese Government took the initiative to improve relations with China. In a major policy speech in November 1969 General Ne Win expressed Burma's desire for a restoration of "the cordial and friendly relations which formerly prevailed between our two countries". He promised that Burma would "strive towards that end", but reminded Peking that "it takes two to make a friendship, and it is up to the other side also to try"(11). A year later Rangoon sent its ambassador back to Peking, a move reciprocated by the Chinese Government in the spring of 1971. At about the same time Peking media halted the attacks on the Burmese Government which had been going on since the summer of 1967. The process of restoring normal State relations between Burma and China was capped by the Chinese Government's invitation to President Ne Win to visit China. This he did in August 1971, conferring with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou in Peking before journeying to Canton where he expressed his "joy and deep satisfaction for having reached an understanding in the discussion on the various matters concerning the two countries and international problems".

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FOLLOWING General Ne Win's trip to China, Sino-Burmese relations on the Government-to-Government level were not only normalized but expanded. The Chinese aid mission returned to Burma to resume work on such projects as the Takaw bridge and to begin others pursuant to the 1961 Economic Agreement which still had an unexpended balance of some US$56 million. China also extended a commodity loan to Burma. Numerous exchanges have taken pla between the two countries of athletic teams (such ping pong, badminton, volley ball and tennis), cultu troupes, medical and other delegations, and tra missions.

But this tangible improvement in Sino-Burm official relations was not accompanied by a reduction Chinese assistance to the BCP insurgents, as t Burmese had hoped and expected it would be, follow Prime Minister Ne Win's visit to China. In fact t trend seemed to be the other way. In the autumn 1971, troops of the North-east command, with logis support from China, launched an attack on Kunlo the largest town on the upper Salween. Althou Government forces withstood this attack which las for weeks, in the subsequent two years the B insurgents overran thousands of square miles Burmese territory between the Salween and the Chin border and engaged the Burmese Army in some of heaviest fighting in its modern history. Estimated number between seven and ten thousand, the insurge fought in battalion units, used conventional tactics, a were equipped with automatic weapons. Some of th Chinese-made arms were superior to the weapons of Burmese army(12).

BCP bullets were backed by BCP propagan also by courtesy of China. Not long after Peking ra stopped attacking the Burmese Government a powe new radio calling itself the *Voice of the People Burma* and located in Chinese territory took up attack. It pledged to "strive and fight for the Bur Communist Party's ultimate aim: to establish Communist system in Burma"(13). Living up to pledge, this radio preached rebellion against Government of Burma, boasted of BCP milit victories, reported on developments in the "liberat areas controlled by the BCP, and blasted b American "imperialism" and Soviet "socialist imper ism".

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THE way Sino-Burmese relations developed a General Ne Win's visit to China in August 1 and the full restoration of State relations is worthy study by countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines which have recently established S relations with China but have also to contend w Chinese supported Communist insurgencies. Norm zation of Sino-Burmese State relations, and even t expansion, was accompanied for several years intensified Communist insurgent activity with increa Chinese support. The Burmese experience is wo noting not because it will necessarily happen elsewh but because it demonstrates that two such appare contradictory developments can take place simu neously.

Just why Peking wanted to play it that way

urma is still a matter for speculation. Its normalization of State relations with Rangoon is easy to explain. uch a step was entirely consistent with the post-Cultural Revolution trend in Chinese foreign policy of normalizing" State relations, a trend greatly accelerated by Peking's taking China's seat in the United ations in the autumn of 1971 and its détente with the nited States, highlighted by President Nixon's visit to hina in February 1972.

But Peking's support of increased BCP military ctivity, in apparent contradiction to this general ormalization trend, is harder to understand. If ntentions can be equated with results, it can be rmised that Peking's principal objective was to have n extensive "liberated" zone along its border with urma. Such a zone, extending along the Sino-Burmese order from Kokang and the Shweli River South to the urma-Laos border, was in fact created by the BCP ilitary campaigns from late 1971 to early 1974.

Whatever Peking's motive may have been for pporting the BCP conquest of this territory, not only th Chinese arms and equipment but also with rsonnel, that support seems to have been reduced nce some time in 1974. Presumably partly in consenence, although the BCP insurgents have been able to ld their "liberated" areas East of the Salween relatively intact, they have suffered serious reverses West of the lween. Can this trend of decreasing Chinese support material and manpower to the BCP insurgency be pected to continue, or is the disappointing experience the years following U Ne Win's 1971 visit to China ely to be repeated?

The chances seem to be good that that experience ll not be repeated. Times have changed; Sino-Burse relations are conducted in a different context now an during the Vietnam War. The American thdrawal from Indo-China and the Communist tory there have intensified competition between oscow and Peking in South-east Asia. In the context Sino-Soviet rivalry, the Burmese Government holds onger cards vis-à-vis Peking than it did in the context Sino-American rivalry. At a time when Peking is reasingly concerned with Soviet influence in South-t Asia, it must take the Burmese Government more iously than before.

The Burmese Government is closer both ideologily and in terms of State relations to Moscow than it r was to Washington. According to Soviet commenors, the new Burmese constitution which was put into ect early in 1974 is very similar to that of the Soviet ion. Soviet media have praised the Burmese vernment's reforms and condemned the insurgencies, luding the "followers and supporters of Peking"(14). king may suspect the Burmese Government, and ecially Burma's sole legal political party, the Burma ialist Programme Party, of being infiltrated by iet sympathizers and vulnerable to Soviet blandishnts.

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IN THE framework of Sino-Soviet hostility Burma occupies a more strategic position geographically as well as politically than in the context of Sino-American hostility. Burma not only enjoys good relations with India but has a long border with that country and a very long Indian Ocean coastline. China has displayed great sensitivity to Soviet relations with India and to alleged Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean; Peking media have described the Soviet friendship treaty with India as "in reality a military alliance"(15). If Burma allowed the Soviet Union to establish naval bases on its coasts(16), Moscow, especially with Indian co-operation, could seriously threaten China's access to the eastern Indian Ocean. Thus, in the light of Peking's worries about Moscow's efforts to encircle China and its "alliance" with India, Ne Win's declaration during his recent visit to Peking that "we ourselves never allowed any country to establish in Burma any base for hostile activities against another country, especially any of our neighbours, nor shall ever do so in future" is a commitment of real value to Peking.

The importance to China of Burma's goodwill has also been enhanced by the emergence of a victorious Hanoi as a potential rival to Peking in South-east Asia. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War relations between Hanoi and Peking have shown signs of strain. Peking has been especially concerned about Hanoi's relations with Moscow, even fearing that the Soviet Union might obtain naval bases in Vietnam(17). Consistent with its policy of "positive neutrality" the Burmese Government lost no time in recognizing the new government in Saigon following the Communist victory and in raising the rank of its representation in both Hanoi and Saigon to embassy level. By consolidating its relations quickly with a potential rival for influence in South-east Asia, Rangoon has contributed to Peking's incentive to maintain good State relations with Burma.

In addition to the fear of driving Rangoon into the arms of Moscow and Hanoi, another restraint on Peking's stepping up assistance to the BCP as it did in 1971 is the damage this might do to the image it is trying to project to the developing countries of the Third World, especially to the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the process of establishing diplomatic relations with three of these countries Peking has sought to reassure them with regard to Chinese support of the Peking-oriented Communist insurgencies that have plagued them for years. While reaffirming China's commitment to support "just struggles" of oppressed peoples throughout the world, Chinese leaders have also told their South-east Asian counterparts that China believes that the peoples of a country must choose their own form of government and that it subscribes to the five principles of peaceful co-existence(18). The late Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, the first of the ASEAN statesmen to make the pilgrimage to Peking to establish diplomatic relations, said on his return to

Kuala Lumpur that he had received "categorical assurances" from Chairman Mao and Premier Chou that China considered the insurgency in Malaysia a "purely internal problem to be dealt with as we see fit"(19). While Burma is not a member of ASEAN it is on familiar terms with the ASEAN countries and its reputation for seeking Peking's friendship has long been established. The kind of support which the Chinese rendered the BCP in its campaigns from 1971 to 1974 could hardly be concealed from Burma's neighbours(20).

To recapitulate, contrary to what might have been expected, the first post-Vietnam War year has been a poor one for Communist insurgency in Burma. Although the BCP insurgents retained their grip on the "liberated" areas in eastern Burma, they suffered severe reverses elsewhere in the country, and Peking's material assistance appears to have dwindled. At the same time, with President Ne Win's visit to China in November, Sino-Burmese State relations seem to have reached heights of cordiality not achieved since the early 1960s. These developments have been due in part to the intensified rivalry between Peking and Moscow in South-east Asia in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Politically and geographically the Burmese Government holds a stronger hand in the context of Sino-Soviet rivalry than it did in that of Sino-American hostility. The new relationships evolving in South-east Asia between Peking and the ASEAN countries also enhance the importance to China of the Burmese Government's goodwill and co-operation. However, Peking's current emphasis on State relations with Burma does not mean that it has abandoned the BCP insurgents. The CPC's support was, in fact, publicly reaffirmed following the deaths of Thakins Zin and Chit(21).

While the prospects seem reasonably good that the favourable trend in Sino-Burmese State relations will continue for some time, these prospects are clouded by three major uncertainties. They relate (not necessarily in order of importance) to the outcome of the succession struggles in China, the future of Sino-Soviet relations, and the Burmese Government's ability to cope with its domestic problems, especially in the economic field. The scope of this article will not allow more than a cursory look at these three large questions, but some answers are worth attempting.

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FOR years there has been speculation among China-watchers about the kind of leadership China would have after the death of Chairman Mao and the direction Chinese policy would then take. Since January 1975, when the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) was held, however, it has been apparent that a leadership has been put together and policies laid down that are meant to provide for a smooth transition of power and a continuity of policy after the deaths of Mao and Chou. The Congress, which proved to be a kind of grand swan song for Chou, bo his stamp of approval, but for reasons that are st unclear Mao did not attend, giving rise to t impression that he did not fully approve all of actions. Moreover, periodic attacks in the Chine media on the pragmatic economic policies laid down the Congress and the leaders associated with them see to have had Mao's blessing. In any event, it is clear th the Congress did not end factionalism in the leadersh or debate over fundamental policies(22).

Nevertheless, while uncertainty about post-M policies and leadership continues, the policies a leadership endorsed by the Fourth NPC seem to ha survived the radicals' attacks and Chou's death. reversion to the radical policies of the Cultur Revolution period which all but wrecked Sino-Burme State relations seems unlikely. In fact an accelerat trend away from such policies after Mao's demise wou not be surprising. Such a trend would augur well for t continuation of good Sino-Burmese State relation

It would probably also lead to a moderation Sino-Soviet hostility. To the extent that this hostility fed by Mao's personal animosity against the Sovi leadership and his fear of the contaminating influen of Soviet "revisionism" on Maoist revolutionary valu his death will have removed a cause for its continuatio A de-emphasis on revolutionary ideology in post-M China would further undercut the basis for Sino-Sov animosity. But, in view of Burma's good State relatio with both China and the Soviet Union, an improveme in Sino-Soviet relations in the wake of Mao's de would not necessarily be detrimental to Sino-Burm relations. What would threaten these relations would a shift in Sino-Soviet relations to one extreme or t other. Thus armed conflict between the two gia Communist Powers could well involve Burma territory, especially if India became engaged, to t untold harm of Burma and with consequences for relations with China impossible to foresee. At the oth extreme, a rapprochement between Peking and Mosc to the point of co-operation in support of Commun insurgency in South-east Asia would undermi Peking's incentive to maintain good relations wi Rangoon. Since neither of these developments see probable, it does not seem likely that Sino-Burm State relations will be adversely affected by changes Sino-Soviet relations.

Perhaps the greatest threat to Sino-Burm relations arises from Burma's internal weakness. Wh doing a creditable job of dealing with insurgency on t field of battle, the Burmese Government has not be effective in handling the country's economic proble many of which are of its own creation(23). For years t Burmese economy has been stagnant, failing consiste ly to meet the Government's modest growth goals. recent years inflation and unemployment, especia among educated youth, have reached dangero proportions. Expanded educational and medical s

vices, of which the Revolutionary Government was rightly proud in the early years of its power, have been severely crippled by lack of funds. Most serious of all, unless present trends in the population to food ratio are quickly reversed, Burma will soon be unable to feed itself for the first time in history.

Despite this sorry economic record, as long as insurgency is confined mainly to the remoter areas of the country and the insurgents are composed primarily of the minority peoples who inhabit those areas, the survival of the Government in Rangoon is not seriously threatened. But if a revolutionary situation emerges in the heartland of Burma, among the Burmans themselves, as a result of economic adversity brought on by Government policies, insurgents will be presented with a genuine opportunity to come to national power. Faced with a situation which held promise of early revolutionary success in Burma's heartland, the temptation for Peking to shift its emphasis from State relations to support of the BCP insurgency might be irresistible, especially if Hanoi were to offer the BCP alternative backing.

The flexibility which Peking enjoys in the amount of material support it may provide the BCP (or any other Peking-oriented) insurgency was pointed up by a *Voice of the People of Burma* broadcast on 21 December 1975(24). Significantly coming not long after President Ne Win's cordial reception in Peking, this broadcast by the BCP enemies of Ne Win stressed the importance of self-reliance in the revolutionary struggle, quoting "Comrade Mao Tse-tung" in support of such a policy. But the broadcast also quoted Mao in support of international assistance for the liberation struggles of oppressed peoples and pointed out: "While practising self-reliance, if we can also gain international support, the Burmese revolution will accelerate and spread with greater momentum." Thus on Mao's authority Peking has wide latitude in determining the degree of assistance it will provide the BCP, allowing it to make decisions on the basis of practical considerations of opportunity and advantage which vary with time and circumstance.

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PROTECTED by high mountains on its land frontiers, Burma has long pursued a policy of proud independence and go-it-alone non-alignment. In some respects, after the Vietnam War, it now seems more isolated than ever. To paraphrase Julius Caesar, all South-east Asia is now divided into three parts: the Communist states of Indo-China, the ASEAN countries, and Burma. Yet Burma's value as a neutral buffer state has been enhanced by the rearrangement of the lines of political tension in South-east Asia following the war. More than ever it is to the interest of all the countries of the region that Burma's neutralist role be preserved.

There have been suggestions in the past that Burma might join ASEAN. Except for neighbouring Thailand, Burma has generally been on excellent terms with ASEAN's member countries, and even relations between Rangoon and Bangkok have improved in recent years. Moreover, as paragraph 10 of the Sino-Burmese Joint Communiqué of 15 November 1975 notes, Burma (as well as China) endorses "the positive proposition for establishing South-east Asia as a zone of peace, neutrality and freedom" a proposal espoused by ASEAN. But Rangoon apparently feels that its policy of pristine neutrality would be compromised by joining ASEAN, some of whose members still maintain military ties with outside Powers. Furthermore, Burma's official ideology is not compatible with the politico-economic systems of the ASEAN countries, which lean toward free enterprise rather than socialism.

From ASEAN's standpoint, Burma's membership would hardly be an inviting prospect. It would give ASEAN boundaries with China and India for the first time, which would only add to the security problems of the ASEAN countries. Moreover, Burma would bring to ASEAN an insurgency situation which for complexity, intractability and extent exceeds that now suffered by any of its members. In short, in the context of present international tensions and alignments in the region, Burma's geopolitical position makes it unsuitable for ASEAN membership.

Nevertheless Burma's continued viability is important to its ASEAN neighbours. In a situation of Sino-Soviet tension, with India aligned on the Soviet side, Burma's independence and neutrality contributes to their security and to the stability of the region as a whole. Fortunately, Burma enjoys friendly State relations with its neighbours as well as with the major Powers. The economic assistance it receives from abroad has been crucial to the economic development that has taken place in the country and has provided the foreign exchange necessary to keep Burma internationally solvent. It is important that such assistance continues, without political strings but with conditions that will ensure the accomplishment of its economic development goals. It is also important that Burma's neighbours and other Powers keep hands off politically. The time may not be ripe for the realization of the ASEAN dream of making all South-east Asia a neutralized zone "free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers", but a good start could be made if all applied this principle to Burma.

Notes and References

1. *The New York Times* [*NYT*], 22 March 1975. See also M. C. Tun, "A fatal mistake for Burma's Communists", *Far Eastern Economic Review,* [*FEER*], 23 May 1975, pp. 32 & 35.

2. Also illustrative of Burma's insurgency problem, and of the Government's careful balancing of its foreign relations, was another story and another map on the same front page. These dealt with military operations against the insurgents supported from Thailand.

3. *Peking Review* [*PR*], 21 November 1975, p. 8.

4. The Joint Communiqué, which was issued on 15 November is reproduced in *ibid.*, pp. 6 & 9.

5. Paragraph 3 of the Revolutionary Council's announcement of 2 March 1962 on the foreign policy of the Union of Burma reads: "They reaffirm their conviction that the policy of positive neutrality pursued by the Union of Burma ever since her independence is the policy best suited to her in the context of prevailing world conditions, and that its faithful pursuance best serves the larger interests both of Burma and of the world." *Foreign Policy of the Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma* (Rangoon: The Burma Socialist Programme Party, 1968) pp. 5-6.

6. *Area Handbook for Burma* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1971), p. 192.

7. See F. S. V. Donnison, *Burma,* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970), p. 234.

8. *Foreign Policy of the Revolutionary Government,* p. 26.

9. Robert A. Holmes, "Sino-Burmese Relations: Bellwether of Chinese Diplomacy", *Current Scene,* 10 May 1972, p. 6.

10. John H. Badgley, "The Communist Parties of Burma", in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 313 & 325.

11. Quoted in *Area Handbook For Burma,* p. 194.

12. For one of the few published accounts of this BCP activity see "Trouble in the Triangle", *Time,* 25 March 1974, p. 47.

13. Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

14. Denzil Peiris, "A friend in need", *FEER,* 18 February 1974, p. 32.

15. See for example, "New Tsars, Old Dream: Social Imperialism's Expansion in South Asia and Indian Ocean", *PR,* 7 December 1973, pp. 15-16.

16. According to Press reports, the Soviet Union has already made the "suggestion" to Burma that naval facilities be granted to it on Burma's Coco Islands. See *NYT,* 7 August 1975, p. 2.

17. "Fighting a new kind of war", *FEER,* 29 September 1975, p. 10.

18. Such statements were made, for example, by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping during visits to Peking of Philippine President Marcos and Thai Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in June 1975: see respectively *PR,* 13 June 1975, p. 9 and *PR,* 4 July 1975, p. 9.

19. *The Washington Post,* 23 June 1974.

20. See M. C. Tun; "Ruffled Waters", in "China '74 Focus", p. 37, *FEER,* 4 October 1974.

21. *PR,* 30 May 1975, p. 3.

22. For a well-informed analysis of leadership divisions and policy issues persisting after the Fourth NPC see Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Internal Political Scene", *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1975, pp. 1-11.

23. It is only fair to point out that, to the extent that foreign countries have supported Burma's insurgencies, they have also contributed to Burma's economic problems.

24. Reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service,* IV, 30 December, 1975.

MICRONESIA: *This often-neglected group of islands in the western Pacific has in the past played an important role in events in East and South-east Asia, and could well do so in the future.*

Then as Now: Reflections on Japan and the United States in the Pacific

Felix Moos

THE future political development of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands of Micronesia will depend ultimately on the territory's lationship with the United States and with other cific nations, particularly Japan. Japan, ever since king over most of the islands in the Western cific from Germany in 1914, has had a major erest in the area: then and during World War II was a military interest, now it has become a marily economic one. Many observers of Micrones have remarked that "things move very slowly in lau", but events *are* moving and the complexities that only-too-often forgotten region *are* changing.

On 17 June 1975, in a plebiscite held in the rthern Marianas, over 78% of the "Chamorros" d other residents of that district decided that they uld like to join the "American Political Family" as Commonwealth. As of now (March 1976) the ited States legislature has not approved this rangement. Nevertheless, it can be reasonably umed that at least this most north-western district Micronesia has chosen to seek some permanent s with the United States.

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NOT many people have an accurate picture of Micronesia. This vast area has since 1947 en an American administered, United Nations ategic Trusteeship. Far too many Americans ntinue to think of the United States as pri-rily a Europe-, or currently Middle East-focused tion. Yet, in spite of Vietnam, America remains a cific Power. Guam today in the 1970s is perhaps re American than it ever was. Hawaii has become State, — which it was not when Pearl Harbour s attacked. Midway Island and the Ballistic Missile Range in the Marshall Islands remain vital to United States strategic interests.

For the first time in US history there are now two Asian-American Senators in Washington, and there are a growing number of Congressmen and women with Asian-American ancestry, representing Pacific-oriented constituencies. America is tied increasingly to the Pacific by tradition and culture, as it has in the past been tied to Europe. The some 2,100 islands of Micronesia cover over 3 million square miles of the Western Pacific near the Equator, with a land area only slightly larger than the State of Hawaii. The some 114,000 Micronesians still live in ramshackled wooden huts with rusting tin roofs; they are still largely unskilled and have a per capita income of about US$650 a year. They speak nine different languages and various dialects. English has largely replaced Japanese as the *lingua franca,* but Japanese is making a come-back. The schools are patterned on an American model, but there are local variations. Of the two-thirds of the population that has grouped itself around the six district centres (the Marshall Islands, Ponape, Truk, the Northern Marianas, Yap and Palau), most work for the Trust Territory Government in one capacity or another. In 1974, the United States spent about US$70 million to keep the Trust Territory economically afloat. The economy that does exist is largely, in its consumer-product orientation, dominated by Japan. What brought Japan to these islands in the Western Pacific? What do we know about this vast area?

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IT WAS not until the dawn of the twentieth century that the islands of Micronesia became a matter of consequence in international affairs. Al-

though discovered early in the sixteenth century, the islands' poverty of resources and their scattered position, far from the established trade routes, insured them against all exploitation except religious exploitation. Fernando Magellan was the first European to reach Micronesia, in company with men who, when supplies were gone, "lived on leather, rats, the sweepings of the ships, meal full of maggots, or, more often, died"(1). He reached land in the Ladrones (or Robber) Islands, as he called them, in 1521. More than a century later the name was changed to Mariana in honour of Maria Anna of Austria. Although the Spaniards' first impressions were far from favourable, they continued to use the islands as a provisioning station on succeeding expeditions to the Philippines. Legaspi, accompanied by Augustinian fathers, attempted formal occupation in 1565, but no government was established. The Jesuits commenced their mission work in 1668 and were the first Europeans to explore the entire Mariana chain. By the time-honoured methods of the Spaniards the religious zeal succeeded and many Mariana Islands' "Chamorros" were converted to Christianity. However, the arbitrary rule of Spanish officials led to a constant succession of rebellions and wars, and it was not until the beginning of the eighteenth century that peace was finally established(2). Discovery of the Carolines, or at least part of them, is usually accredited to the Portuguese navigator, Diego da Rocha, who visited the islands first in 1527. More than a century later in 1686 Francesco Lazeano carried these explorations further and named the islands the "Carlines" in honour of Charles II of Spain. Here, the natives were even less amenable to the Spanish priests than those of the Marianas, for an early visit by missionaries in 1731 resulted in murderous native attacks.

The low, coral atolls of the Marshall archipelago may have been visited as early as 1529 by Alvaro de Saavedra. Captain Wallis, the English navigator, touched the Marshalls in 1767, and in 1788 they were more fully explored by Captains Marshall and Gilbert. Another century was to pass, however, before they were formally occupied. The age of discovery had greater prizes to offer than the minor islands of the Western Pacific. Spanish energies were consumed in the Philippines; those of Portugal in the Moluccas until the Dutch deprived them of that empire in the wars of the seventeenth century. Nearly two hundred years were to pass before the nineteenth century scramble for possession of the Pacific Islands. In the interval, missionaries valiantly struggled to "civilize" the natives, while Western traders, occasional planters and beachcombers pressed them into forced labour. Finally various motives compelled the British to act in the Southern and Western Pacific, — these were: to bring order out of chaos; jealousy of increasing French expansion; the growing belief that Germany, as well, aspired to a place in the sun; and finally, the demand of Australia and New Zealand for annexation unoccupied South Pacific islands. So it was t these islands in Oceania gradually passed to Eu pean Powers and eventually, in the case of East Samoa and much later Guam, to the United Sta

By the late nineteenth century none of th thousands of islands was left free from West sovereignty. Just before the close of that century colonial map of the Pacific gave to the Bri predominance in the southern islands. France established in Tahiti, New Caledonia and the N Hebrides. The Dutch were supreme in the E Indies. Spain's tottering power still held in Philippines, the Carolines and the Marianas; wh Germany was mistress of a large section of N Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the M shalls; in addition Germany was contesting England the United States for control of both Western a Eastern Samoa. Germany was in fact a late arrival the Pacific. Bismarck, the creator of the Germ Empire, had essentially opposed colonization, but increasing activities of German traders and th demands for protection forced him into a po which previously he had denounced. Spain had b slow to assert its rights in the Carolines and it not until 1875 that it sought to make its posit there secure. But the days of Spain's colonial em in the Pacific were already numbered.

German traders were not content to rem South of the equator. Their adventures, at purely commercial, led gradually to the ambiti colonial policy which had its inception in the 18 and resulted by 1885 in the annexation of Marshalls. At the same time the German Gove ment, following the lead of its increasingly aggress merchant-seamen, contested Spain's recently asser rights to the Carolines. The arbitration of Pope L XIII, who was called upon to render a "neu judgment", upheld Spain's sovereignty but stipula that Germany should henceforth enjoy liberal tra concessions. In 1897 Germany seized Kiaochow North China as a naval station and when, in following year the Spanish-American war broke o German interest in the Pacific and the Far East at its height. It was Germany's hope and belief t it would fall heir to all the Spanish lands in Pacific; to this end all Berlin's diplomatic eff were directed. It appears that Germany's schem and England's pro-American sympathies had a co derable bearing on the US annexation of Philippines and Guam. When, therefore, the was over, nothing remained to satisfy Germa colonial ambitions save the Carolines and Marianas, which, with the exception of Gua Germany now proceeded to purchase from Spain some US$4,500,000. By the close of the ninetee Century, Germany had acquired all of the islands Micronesia which were eventually to constitute pan's League of Nations Mandate.

The administration which Germany now gave ese islands was noteworthy. Under Spanish rule, rtifications were erected in Yap and Ponape, and e inhabitants were subjected to the teachings of the anish priesthood, but beyond that very little was ne. Spanish officials' energy continued to concenite on the Philippines. The German attitude was ry different. A period of vigorous government d trade came with the establishment of the Jaluit mpany soon after Germany had taken over the arshalls. Government enterprise replaced this pri- e concern after 1906 and all island industries came part of a virtual colonial monopoly. Despite e islands' limited resources, the Germans envisaged e new island empire as a growing, important ncern. In 1904, a submarine cable was laid nnecting Yap with Shanghai, Guam, and Menado the Dutch Celebes; and in 1913 radio telegraph s installed. German scientists explored the reurces of the islands and discovered, among other ngs, the phosphate deposits of Anguar in Palau trict. German culture was spread by a hundred ssionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, who ablished the first real schools in Micronesia. obably it is correct to say that German efficiency, stered by a determined attitude to make the most such colonies as it had, resulted in an administran that had much to recommend it, despite the t that the basic motive was economic exploitation l imperial policy. As a small footnote we should e that trading in firearms and the sale of alcohol he natives was prohibited, and in numerous ways administration sought to protect the inhabitants m unscrupulous traders. But change was coming n, for in 1914 Germany's empire in the Pacific uld pass forever.

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COLONIAL and expansionist tendencies in Japan were coming to the fore by the close of the eteenth century, a mere fifteen years after peror Meiji had come to power in 1868, ending e than 250 years of xenophobic feudalism in an. As preliminary steps in the adjustment of an's boundaries, in 1875 Japan secured recogni- by Russia of its title to the Kuril Islands, while rting full sovereignty over Okinawa in the South, re China had long professed a vague title of rainty. Japan's claim to the Bonin Islands was gnized. In 1895 Japan gained the island of wan, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung peninsula outh Manchuria. At the end of the Russo-Japa- War (1904-05), Russia transferred its leasehold rests in South Manchuria together with the ion of the southern half of the island of Sakhalin. 1910 Japan had annexed Korea.

By these successive steps, when World War I e out in 1914, Japan had expanded its empire. n's national vitality, supported by military and naval strength, brought an envied but perhaps questionable reward, — recognition as a Great Power. Then came the War, during which Japanese and Australian cruisers, having cleared the Pacific of German naval craft, took possession of its island empire. Before the end of the siege of Tsingtao, the German naval base in North China, the Japanese fleet had destroyed German prestige in the Pacific by taking the largest of the Marshall islands on 6 October 1914, seizing the cable station on Yap the next day, and establishing complete control in all three island groups (Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas) before the end of the month.

It would be wrong, however, to assume or infer, that Japan was a stranger to Micronesia when these events occurred. Although there is no evidence to support it, some Japanese historians favour the presumption that there was an early intercourse between Japan and the islands as a natural result of their geographical location. A current theory in Japan at this time was that some of the native peoples of Micronesia came from Japan by way of the Bonins and the Marianas(3). Be this as it may, the fact remains that Japanese contacts have been considerable since at least the last two decades of the nineteenth century. For example, the **Koshin Sha** (Development Company) organized in 1896, was operating in Ponape in 1914. The **Hioki** South Sea Trading Company, founded in 1893, had branches on Ponape, Truk, Saipan, and Guam. In 1906, this company was amalgamated with the **Murayama Shokai** and, under the name of the famous South Sea Trading Company, conducted an extensive business in most of the Micronesian islands(4). This was the prevailing situation in 1914. Japanese expansion had extended far along the coast line of continental Asia. The Kuril Islands, the southern half of Sakhalin, Okinawa, the Bonins, and the Pescadores had become Japanese territory. But all of these islands lay relatively close to Japan proper and were quite naturally seen as part of Tokyo's natural sphere of influence. When however, late in 1914, Japan, as one of the Allies, seized all of the German islands in Micronesia North of the equator, Japanese influence was suddenly propelled into a zone of the Pacific which had been controlled previously by western Europeans and the United States. The British, the French, the Germans, the Dutch, and the Americans had, either by discovery, occupation or military conquest acquired a territorial monopoly in the Pacific islands. American apprehension quite suddenly began to rise. Annexation of the Philippines and Guam at the end of the Spanish American War had been preceded by an event of perhaps even greater importance. By a joint resolution of Congress, in July 1898, the Hawaiian Islands in the mid-Pacific, became American soil and, in January 1899, the then uninhabited Wake Island some 2,000 miles West of Hawaii were formally occupied by the United States Navy as a relay cable station. Fascinat-

ing is the fact, that the annexation of Hawaii by the United States at the time was protested by both Japan and Great Britain.

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WHEN the islands of Micronesia passed from Germany to Japan in 1914, they passed from a nation to which they were strategically rather useless, to a nation that might, and eventually did, employ them strategically to great advantage. Japan entered the World War I peace discussions with the belief that the Pacific islands which its navy had taken from Germany would now become a permanent part of the Japanese empire. The premises were that these islands, by reason of their geographical position, have a close relationship with Japan and have an important bearing on Japan's security and defence. Japanese control and rule over Micronesia eventually came to be complete and direct. The policy of the League of Nations Mandate was to develop the islands economically. Japan did begin to develop Micronesia economically, and in the process settled some 19,484 males and some 12,730 females in the six administrative districts by 1933 (Saipan, Yap, Palau, Truk, Ponape and Jaluit [Marshalls]), comprising the **Nanyo Gunto** (Government of the South Seas). At the time, the native population was estimated at 25,766 males and 24,169 females(5). By the 1930s Japan began to establish military bases in all districts in preparation for World War II(6). Although Japanese rule was intended primarily for the benefit of the Empire, many Micronesians now look back to the period with varying degrees of nostalgia. The period was marked by relative prosperity, peace, and propriety in the relations between the inhabitants of the islands.

The map of Europe was redrawn in 1919 reflecting the Wilsonian principles of self-determination and non-annexation. So, were the maps of Africa and Asia after World War II. Following World War I, at the Versailles Conference, Japan sought the outright annexation of the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls, to which Great Britain and the other European Allies had agreed secretly in 1916. President Wilson, however, opposed Japanese annexation — not just in principle but also because of the realization that Japanese possession of Micronesia was not in the best interest of the United States — since these islands could be used against the American possessions of Guam and the Philippines — and ultimately — Hawaii.

Already by 1920, only force could have dislodged the Japanese. Wilson thus proceeded to preserve the then minimal United States strategic interest through the adoption of the concept of mandates. In 1920, the Council of the League of Nations confirmed a Class C Mandate for Japan which provided that the islands were to be open to visitation and that they remain unfortified. The Japanese did not immediately close the islands to [illegible] and all inquisitive visitors. However, they soon made coming to Micronesia very difficult for all, Americans especially. Although it is now reasonably certain that Japan did not immediately begin to fortify the islands, they had done so by the 19[illegible] when war began to look possible, but large-scale militarization did not occur until the late 19[illegible] when war in China had already begun.

In East Asia, World War II lasted for three years and eight months, from December 1941 when Pearl Harbour was air-attacked to August 19[illegible] when Japan was atom-bombed. There were four principal contestants, the United States, Japan, China, and Britain. Britain was eliminated fairly early, its rapid defeat in the Pacific proving how effectively Japan had created its strategic and interests in conjunction with its economic policy. China remained for all practical purposes a dependent of the Allies, and the Chinese theatre of operations — for the Japanese — remained fairly static from 1940 to 1945. Thus, the main contestants were Japan and the United States.

World War II was perhaps the last large-scale conflict not restricted or inhibited by any limiting considerations, either social, psychological, economic, and it was a straight contest for victory or defeat. Two general phases are clear: one, the period of ascendancy of Japan, and two, the period of decline from this superiority and the rise of the United States after Pearl Harbour. The Japanese strategy was something like this: to retain Korea and the parts of China already conquered; to conquer the chain of islands from Japan to the East Indies and occupy Burma and Indo-China, the latter seized from France; to occupy the Malay Peninsula and neutralize Thailand; to establish inner and outer defence lines in the Pacific; to cut off the United States from its Western allies by controlling communications between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Pearl Harbour was bombed, and the American navy and air fleets were immobilized — at least for a number of months. From the Kuril Islands to Wake and the Gilberts an outer defence line stretched nearly 4,000 miles East from Japan. Simultaneously a multi-pronged *Blitzkrieg* followed southward by land, sea, and air. Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya fell by February 1942, and the (Dutch-held) East Indies by June 1942; along with them also fell a number of small islands necessary to secure communication with the home islands of Japan. Thus a Japanese inner defence line was established through the Marianas, Guam, Yap, Palau, and down to the East Indies.

Ironically enough, precisely when Japan appeared invincible, at the height of its conquests, it headed for decline. The battles of the Coral Sea

Midway were to become the prelude to the American offensives in the Pacific eventually leading to the defeat of Japan. The American strategy was as follows: to break the outer Japanese defence line through the Central Pacific by a three-pronged attack across Wake, the Gilberts and the Marshalls, and through a flank across the Coral Islands and the Solomons. New Guinea was retaken in 1943, the Philippines in 1944, and, with the simultaneous fall of the adjacent chain of islands, the Japanese inner ring of the defence line was also broken up.

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IT HAS been suggested, and most likely correctly so, that one of the most significant changes brought about by World War II was the emergence of what may be called the Pacific era of world politics, just as the preceding era has been described as the European era. For something like 400 years, beginning around 1498, it was the nations of Western Europe bordering on the Atlantic who set the course of world history. Their wars, their ambitions, and their decisions constituted world history. Now, however, the center of political gravity may well have shifted, partially at least, to the Pacific. In the Pacific region, there is, for the first time in human history, a spectacular meeting of the current super-Powers of the world. Four of the world's six continents — or five, if one regards Europe as a geographical extension of Asia — rim the Pacific and make up three quarters of the world population. The two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, come capriciously close to one another in the Pacific across the Bering Strait. In fact, during winter, even that narrow strait disappears. The Pacific is now also becoming the birthplace of two other potential super-Powers, Japan and the People's Republic of China (PRC). If we can believe Herman Kahn, the twenty-first century will be perhaps the Japanese century(7).

These nations are each rediscovering their inherent strengths. Thus, dramatic and momentous confrontations can be expected during the remaining years of this century. The potential for disastrous conflicts in the Pacific — or for a hopeful reshaping of the world from the Pacific — now arises. In terms of culture, three of the four continents (Australia, North America, and South America) are extensions of Europe. It is in the Pacific where we today find the greatest potential concentration of future industrial and military power. The Pacific is larger than the whole land surface of the globe. Its immensity creates special problems of strategy. Distance gives protection but also creates surprises, as Pearl Harbour amply illustrated. In the 1940s, the United States Navy , with mobility and flexibility, created a revolution in naval strategy, contrasting strongly with the British traditions of fixed bases and fighting always relatively close to land. In missile terms, the Pacific makes the nuclear, as well as the traditional submarine, a much smaller needle in a much bigger haystack. In military terms — as well as in commerce — it calls for larger and faster ships and for greater and more sophisticated aerial and satellite surveillance.

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THE East coast of Asia is screened by three large island nations — Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia — in whose histories the sea continues to play a major part and whose national interests have a definite maritime dimension. In contrast, the scattered islands of Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia assume significance primarily because of their communications facilities and for the strategic opportunities they afford to other Powers for distant defence (as for Japan in World War II), or for threats of distant offensive initiatives.

The United States, it is clear today, is geographically a Pacific Power. Unfortunately however, especially after Vietnam, the US is perhaps not ready psychologically or politically to accept this fact. Although the width of the Pacific between the US West Coast and Japan or China may suggest that the Pacific separates America from Asia, it is not so. From Alaska, the Soviet Union in Asia is visible, as we have pointed out, at the peak of the Pacific arch across the Bering Straits. The top of the chain of the Aleutian islands, which reaches as far West as New Zealand does, is but 600 miles from Soviet Kamchatka and 1,500 miles from Japan, and the fiftieth State, Hawaii, extends the United States some 2,900 miles into the Pacific. By including the unincorporated Territory of Guam, surely America is now more than ever a Pacific rather than an Atlantic or Mediterranean Power. The Atlantic equivalent to Hawaii would be the Azores, and the closest the United States comes to Europe is 1,800 miles. The past, however, dies slowly, so do ethnic ties and traditions, and many American eyes and minds remain turned to Europe.

When the residents of Saipan celebrate "Liberation Day" every summer, it is thought that the rounds of speeches and beauty contests commemorate Saipan's liberation from the Japanese in 1944. Only a very few Saipanese now point out to any visitor that it is not only the coming of the American Marines that is celebrated, but also the release of the "Chamorro" population from American internment camps several months after the war had ended and the Japanese had departed.

A similar sense of incongruity and paradox, of things meaning both more and less than they seem, has characterized America's administration of Micronesia. Since 1947, when the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas were constituted as the Trust Territory of

the Pacific Islands (placed by the United Nations under American control), this American experiment in Pacific administration has been marked by cross purposes, mixed emotions, and often confused results.

Micronesia was one of eleven trusts established by the United Nations after World War II. Like other administrative authorities, the US pledged that it would guide the territory toward "self-government or independence". Since then, ten out of the eleven have become independent, New Guinea being the latest. However, Micronesia is, as far as the United States is concerned, different from those other territories. If America is serious in its long range strategic interests in the Pacific — in order to preserve its own security and peace — then it cannot abandon Micronesia completely. By its commitment to Micronesia the US commits itself to the Pacific and to Asia, the latter dimension being particularly important in the post-Vietnam era.

Ever since World War II ended, after the Enola Gay's flight from Tinian in the Marianas, America has wrestled with the problem of how to deal with Micronesia. The US's concern has been twofold: that no other Powers be permitted access to the area, and that the islands be kept open to possible use as Americans fall back from the mainland of Asia. This essential military interest was reflected in the original 1947 trusteeship agreement which, while recognizing Micronesia's right to self-determination, established a veto over the exercise of that right. The area was from the very beginning of the US's administration designated a "strategic trusteeship" (the only one of the eleven UN trusts to be so designated). Micronesia, unlike the other territories was placed under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, where the US could block any change in political status that might threaten its security.

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DURING the first two decades of American administration, it is doubtful that anyone was troubled by the contradiction between America's military interest and its commitment to offer the area eventual independence. The Micronesians, who had after all been previously "administered" by Spaniards, Germans and Japanese, were in no position to worry about territory-wide politics. More a geographic abstraction than a viable political unit, Micronesia turned out to be an administrative challenge. Thousands of islands, with a combined land rea of about half that of the State of Rhode Island, were scattered across an expanse of ocean equivalent in size to the continental United States. And, as we have stated earlier, the 114,000 plus Micronesians remain divided religiously, ethnically, culturally, and linguistically into at least half a dozen major groups. For many years, Micronesians accustomed to putting up with whatever foreig administration washed up on their islands, wer more inclined to think of palatable local realities — their village, their island, at most their group o islands — than to worry about the potentiall schizophrenic nature of the United Nations trustee ship agreement.

When the United States created the Congres of Micronesia in 1965, it took the first importan step toward promoting political advancement on territory-wide basis. And thus it could be claime that the United States created the first real politica sense of unity among all Micronesians from a districts. To take one example of the immens difficulties faced by the Congress of Micronesia, land and land tenure. This question was the firs issue for the new Congress since land was and Micronesia's scarcest resource and its most precious not only because of its scarcity (the density in th late 1960s was 140 people per square mile and onl 100 of the 2,000 islands are inhabited or inhabit able), but because of the role it plays in traditiona cultural patterns. Only in the Marianas does lan tenure resemble the Western system in law and i spirit.

The question of land and sovereignty over lan spurred other political negotiations. In 1969, th Future Political Status Commission of the Congre of Micronesia went to work. At the end of Ju 1968, the Commission had produced its first interi report which concentrated on identifying alternati political options for all six districts of Micronesia *viz.*, independence, free association, integration wit a major Power, and continuation as a Tru Territory.

After the initial negotiations of the Commissio with the United States, two inescapable realities we recognized: the fact of longstanding American strat gic interests in the area and the need for Micron sian self-government. In the summer of 1970, th Congress of Micronesia endorsed the report of th Status Commission and established a Political Statu Delegation to negotiate further with the Unite States Government. This delegation was authorize to press for an early resolution of the future politica status of Micronesia and to take part in preliminar discussions regarding future relations between Micr nesia and the United States. Talks began i Washington in September 1969. By early 1976, thes talks are still scheduled to continue. However, in th meantime, in a June 1975 referendum, the people o the Northern Marianas have decided that they woul like to become a part of the United States, and bill making the Northern Marianas an America Commonwealth is now before the US Congress(8 Kusaie, in Ponape District is expected to become separate district. Thus six Micronesian districts co

inue to look for a suitable political future, without he Northern Marianas.

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IF THE Chamorros of the Northern Marianas are the "disaffected" (in terms of "Micronesian unity") Micronesians, the driving force for continued discussions with the United States are the Palauans. Ambitious and aggressive, the Palauans are sometimes referred to as the Ibos of the Pacific. For example, the first Micronesian ever to become a lawyer was a Palaun. The chairman of the Future Political Status Delegation is a Palauan. And it is in Palau that a superport and oil storage and refining facilities are being mooted by the Japanese, Palauans and Americans. It is in Palau that a Japanese firm is in the process of building a "mariculture" demonstration centre. It is in Palau that a long needed vocational trade school was established. And it may well be that in Palau Micronesia will enjoy real affluence, as in the Northern Marianas, and the Marshalls, where wealth is derived from the US Ballistic Missile Center on Kwajalein.

The discussion of a possible "Central Terminal Facility" which would guarantee Japan some fuel reserves within a reasonable distance of the home lands, is but another signal that a certain nostalgia for the Japanese is alive and well. The nostalgia for the Japanese in most of the six districts has meant in the past that economic development has been tied to the return of Japanese economic presence and the relative non-economic developmental spirit of the Trust Territory governmental machinery.

Today's Japanese presence is one that is felt primarily through things Japanese. Much of Micronesia's staple diet, other than foods like taro, coconuts, yams, and cassava, is tied invariably to the dietary preferences of Japan. One only has to look at the inventory of a grocery store, where Japanese tinned foods, biscuits, beer and *sake* abound. And, although Micronesian roads are still not suitable for Japanese-made cars, nevertheless it is the Japanese automobile industry that furnishes the means of transport for most of Micronesia. Where there is electricity in the islands, rice is being cooked in Japanese rice cookers, and wherever pots and pans are being sold, the majority of these come from Japan. The outboard motors may be of American manufacture, but the fiberglass boats come from Japan. The list of Japanese material goods is indeed vast. But perhaps more important is the influence that Japan still holds on the life-style of much of Micronesia. Japanese today, 31 years after World War II, is still something of a *lingua franca* among Micronesians over 45. Japanese *kana* (syllabary) is still used by some for written communication. One gets the feeling that a great number of Micronesians think of the Japanese era as one in which Micronesia was being developed and modernized. In the minds of many Micronesians, the Japanese period represented one in which they were slowly pulled into the modern world.

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TO ANYONE who has recently lived in Micronesia, the problem of "success" in administration becomes a fascinating comparison between the accomplishments of Germany, Japan and the United States. America has indeed attempted to introduce a reasonably sophisticated system of education, the impact of which has perhaps not yet been felt in terms of advanced economic development. It has introduced a system of public health that, even at worst, still compares favourably with what the Japanese had done. But it is in the use of land, and large-scale agricultural and marine agricultural entrepreneurship, that the Japanese have surpassed the Americans during the past three decades. But then, such agricultural undertakings are today often negated by the newly found sense of land ownership among Micronesians. If one compares the relative effectiveness of colonial or trust administrations, one may reach the conclusion that the United States has not been a very efficient colonial power. Nevertheless, it becomes equally clear that Americans have created in Micronesia, and especially in the young Micronesians, individuals who are politically more sophisticated and more opportunistic than their elders. The United States has introduced a more equitable system of law and a political participation than any attained or desired by the Japanese. The Germans ruled, the Japanese governed and ruled, while the Americans administer. One can well argue that the current political unrest and dissatisfaction with the American administration is a sign that America has been successful in teaching the Micronesians to think and act for themselves. America has raised Micronesian aspirations but has at the same time failed to fulfil them. Japan's ghost will not disappear, and Japan's presence in Micronesia will depend very much on the unwillingness of the United States to remain a strong Power in the Pacific, as much as on the nostalgic memories of Micronesians for their past masters.

When the cry is raised that only an independent Micronesia can hope for even a modest economic take-off, the cry usually has been based on a somewhat wishful thought that if the United States was not ready to do something, then Japan's new economic presence in the area would surely compensate for America's inactivity. On the other hand, it would simply be untrue to state unequivocally that all Micronesians reject the United States or an American military presence in the islands.

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THE controversies regarding Micronesian independence, future Micronesian political status, and Micronesian strategic importance, will continue to occupy our minds. Nevertheless, it also remains certain that future Micronesian strategic considerations will influence the results of future United States-Japanese relations and future US security policies with regard to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We may argue about aspects of the US presence on a specific island; but we can argue much less successfully for any non-American presence, military or otherwise, or for any neutralization of all Micronesia. Independence for Micronesia, without an American presence in the Western Pacific, may well lead to a future unpleasant to contemplate for those who are governed or administered, and those who govern and administer. Recognition of the strategic importance of Micron sia was, after all, the primary reason for the creati of the UN Strategic Trusteeship under the Unit States administration. That trust was, in effe confirmation — positive or negative — by all U member nations of the military importance of th islands for the United States.

Many Micronesians as well as a number Americans feel that the time is late. But despite t neglect and the mistakes of the past, and despite t Utopian, wishful thinking by some, and despite t nostalgia for "complete" freedom and "real" politi independence, or for Japan and more Japanese goo and money, a solution satisfying to both Micron sians and Americans must and probably will found.

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THE REGION: *"Conferences, adjournments, ultimatums*
Flights in the air
Castles in the air
The autopsy of treaties, dynamite
under the bridge."
Louis MacNeice, *Autumn Journal VII*

Regional Organization and South-East Asia

Peter Lyon

HOW important is regional organization for the peoples and governments of South-east Asia today, in comparison with bilateral diplomatic ties and links with other international organizations? Have regional organizations(1) become more or less important in this region in recent years, and what are their prospects? Who are the main proponents and beneficiaries of regionalist enterprises in South-east Asia today and what are their avowed and apparent purposes? This essay endeavours to provide answers to these questions.

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REGIONS, in international as in domestic politics, are spatial and/or functional ensembles considered as units for the purpose of analysis, synthesis and planning. The extent and character of a particular region will depend upon the purpose or purposes for which it is delineated and it is therefore obvious that, taking the world as a whole, the number of possible regions and of regional associations is very considerable indeed.

Such defining characteristics may be a single factor such as transhumance or trade, diplomatic networks or drainage patterns, religion or relief, language, or, as is commonly the case in contemporary international politics, a cluster of countries whose incumbent governments are declaredly committed to some co-operative venture or enterprises.

Geographers have usefully distinguished two basic types of region: homogeneous and nodal(2). Homogeneous regions are areas within which the similarities between the associated units are more significant than the differences. The "nodal" region is a term used to designate an area of concentration of elements or activities, or the intensively developed core of a more extensive homogeneous region.

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IT IS too often and too easily forgotten that the period since the Second World War marks the inauguration of the first epoch of truly global international politics, and that it is only with decolonization and the consequent emergence of newly independent states that the various incumbent governments of South-east Asia (except for Thailand, which alone escaped formal colonization) have been able to promote and be participant members in inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and in regional and other official international associations. In the days of the colonial ascendancies not only were South-east Asian countries secluded from one another and from the rest of the world (except for "their own" particular metropole), but the very idea that there was a region ("South-east Asia"), was at best a shadowy and esoteric notion which was neither argued by scholars nor asserted by politicians. By design and through the prevailing political inertia of the peoples, the different countries of the region were deliberately cordoned off from contact with each other. Colonial governments did not desire that their subject peoples should have close cultural or economic relations with the subjects of other colonial governments, and still less did they want political relations between peoples living under different colonial regimes. Thus, Filipinos knew little or nothing of Burmese, or Javanese of Vietnamese, even though the technological means for easier and more rapid travel and communications were improving all the time.

The point of drawing attention to these fundamental and rather obvious changes which have occurred within the last thirty years is not only to emphasize the crucial initial importance of decoloni-

zation, but to underline the importance of prevailing political attitudes and practices in determining the nature and pattern of intra-regional relationships at any time.

At least since 1945 much ink and ingenuity has been spent in arguing the case whether or not South-east Asia may be properly designated a region, or whether it is a mere category of convenience in cartography(3). It is not proposed to enter these quasi-metaphysical mists here, for our subject is not "regionalism" in general but regional organization in one part of the contemporary world. And for this purpose, some advance may be made by seeking answers to such questions as: who promotes regionalist schemes? For what purposes, avowed or covert? And with what results?

The purpose of this study is then, neither to laud nor to decry the record of regionalist activities within South-east Asia in recent years. Rather it is to review and appraise this record in general terms and, with a dispassionate eye, pay some regard to the principal uses made, by the governments and peoples operating within the area, of such alternative instrumentalities to regional organization as bilateral relationships — informal and *ad hoc* measures as well as more comprehensive or wider or more functionally specific agencies (see Table at rear). For the obvious fact that in quantative terms at least there is now more regionalist organization in South-east Asia than was the case even a decade earlier, does not necessarily warrant a further deduction that regional organization is, therefore, the most significant trend nor that it is thereby promoting regional co-operation or integration.

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AT NO time since 1945, and not even today, is it the case that all countries of South-east Asia maintain diplomatic relations(4) with each other. In the first place, this is accounted for simply by the fact, whose importance already has been stressed, that all but Thailand have gained their independence since 1945 and at different times (see Table). Internationally, formal independence is a precondition to a full repertoire of diplomatic relationships, even though aspiring independence movements will engage in para-diplomatic activities and attach considerable importance to proto- (what some international lawyers call "premature") recognition and to the insignia and symbols of international status prior to achieving a full international personality. Secondly, an overall pattern of bilateral diplomatic relationships entwining each and every country of a particular region with each other on a bilateral basis is not only a relatively rare condition in regional international politics, but its very achievement requires the predisposing condition of no deeply antagonistic relations between neighbours of the kind that would inhibit and prevent for diplomatic accreditation between them. As much South-east Asia has been afflicted by actual war by the condition of neither war nor peace(5), s 1945, there are many examples of — and reasons — less than full formal bilateral diplomatic relat between neighbouring countries in this region.

In the case of Burma, its relatively restri range of diplomatic relations with its neighb stems primarily from the deliberate desire of governmental leaders to forswear a very ac regional or international role. As between Ma (now Malaysia) and Indonesia, "konfrontasi" i bited and then ended their diplomatic relations u they were restored after the eclipse of Sukarn

The Vietnamese, by reason of ideolog antagonisms and preoccupation with their wars independence and national unification, have very restricted and/or relatively recently fashio diplomatic ties with their neighbours. Whether not they extend these in the next year or so, that the North has won the war for unification, be one significant indicator of the likely nature o foreign policy especially in its regionalist aspe Present indications are that the leaders of Viet are likely to remain hostile or at least indifferen the idea of membership in ASEAN and o specifically South-east Asian regionalist sche whilst participating in UN bodies such as ES (see Glossary for acronyms).

Indeed, a feature of the contemporary w which is a consequence of the great burgeonin international and regional organizations, especial the last two decades, is that organizational ties provide most states with far greater access to facilities of the world outside their boundaries do merely bilateral diplomatic ties. One scho enquiry, conducted by two distinguished Amer researchers in this field nearly ten years ag showed that while only one-eighth of all indepen countries have diplomatic representatives in m than half of the world's capitals, seven-eights o such countries have organizational affiliations more than half of all other independent states. evidence presented by these American scholars i cates that South-east Asian countries are at leas likely, and in some cases more likely, to encou and deal with each other through the aegis of t common membership in international organizati as through purely bilateral channels, even thoug is obviously wrong to regard bilateral dealings being redundant nowadays — especially when sec is required.

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THE use of regional organization in and/or South-east Asia has passed through t stages(8) since 1945 and is still in the third stage.

The first phase which lasted from the end of Second World War until the second half of the 50s was shaped and characterized by the dominance of the United States and Britain in deciding at kind of regional associations there should be in il for South-east Asia. Within South-east Asia in se years Malaya (and the Borneo territories) and gapore remained British colonies, thus cordoned from conducting an independent diplomacy of ir own; Vietnam was convulsed by war; Cambodia l Laos were not fully independent of France until 54; Burma looked westwards to India or even ther to Britain and the United States rather than South-east Asia, and was substantially quietest: tions with its ancient enemy, Thailand, were etly cordial, perhaps in part because in foreign airs the Thai leaders were mostly pre-occupied h the United States in these years; the Philippines for all practical purposes a camp follower of the ted States despite rhetorical proclamations in our of Asian regionalism, from 1946 onwards; onesia seemed uninterested and uninvolved in th-east Asia as such — for Sukarno, the Banng Conference and Afro-Asian stages generally ned more exciting and promising. These were the rs which saw the inception of ECAFE and the ombo Plan(9) — both worthy in their different s, but each in their formative years institutionally k and very reliant on British and American king. Then, in September 1954, SEATO was nally launched, "born an ailing alliance"(10), wedly a South-east Asian treaty organization, but only two full members — Thailand and the lippines — from South-east Asia. In these years, n, South-east Asian initiatives in the matter of ating new regional associations or in working a existing ones, were either non-existent, very ht or merely rhetorical.

The second phase, from the late 1950s until mid 1960s, as well as witnessing the continance of ECAFE and the Colombo Plan and indeed SEATO very much as before, also saw the first ificant stirrings of South-east Asian initiatives in onalist matters which then led on to some rtive, or to individually undramatic but cumulaly quite important, attempts to create institualized co-operation. Two rather different sets of ovation should be distinguished.

At the level of what might loosely be termed gh politics", two schemes were launched — ASA MAPHILINDO (three if one adds ASPAC)(11). h were not to live beyond infancy, though for e different reasons. The second trend, which was be more durable and probably more significant the superficially more eye-catching ASA and PHILINDO, was made by the well-nigh simultaus launching of a considerable number of funcal regional organizations — not only the ADB, though this was the principal and most publicized creation, but also AIEDP, AIDC, AIT, AIEPA and APO. Another sign of a significant change in the regional environment was the active re-entry of Japan, not this time as the proponent of a "Co-Prosperity Sphere", but as a profferer of aid and trade and as a quietly encouraging progenitor of regional organization, not only in respect of the ADB but also MCEDSEA and SEAMEO.

A third phase, of which the present is a part, was formally inaugurated by the inception of ASEAN in August 1967. The most striking and important thing about the launching of ASEAN was Indonesia's active membership in it from the start, symbolizing an end to Indonesia's confrontation campaign and to its previous indifference to practical regionalism in South-east Asia. Indeed, Indonesia's participation is a basic precondition of any really important large-scale regionalist enterprise, given that about half the total population of South-east Asia live in Indonesia.

Even so, it is important to see ASEAN in due proportion and setting, not only by looking closely at its actual record(12) and achievements, but also remembering that other forms of functional co-operation are burgeoning outside its aegis (even though admittedly ASEAN itself has stimulated quite a lot of specialized consultation between its various members), and on occasions some of the other existing organizations — especially ESCAP and ADB — take initiatives of their own.

"By the late sixties", a distinguished British journalist long resident in Singapore has written of South-east Asia, "the more perceptive local leaders had begun to realize that salvation could lie only in social revolution and regional solidarity among themselves."(13) It is dubious, however, whether any governmental leaders were actively salvationists in any sense, but it does seem to be the case that those who came together in ASEAN in 1967 saw in regional association, if not solidarity, perhaps one means of averting social revolution at their own expense. They were and are survivalists, even if not salvationists.

Of course, it remains to be asked if regional associations significantly assist the survival of incumbent governments, and to this question Dennis Bloodworth has provided a deft summary of the recent record and some sharp judgements which are well worth quoting at length:

> "Like the first ice of winter, regional co-operation had begun to crystallize almost imperceptibly into unmatching fragments that had so far only broken the surface tension here and there. New sets of initials in an acronymic age sprawled over the maps of the Far East — ASPAC, co-

vering nine Pacific countries bent on 'greater co-operation and solidarity'; ASEAN, covering five bent on 'accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development through joint endeavour and partnership'; ADB, the Asian Development Bank 'to promote investment, finance regional, sub-regional and national development projects...' These were the Asian civilian sons of the older soldiers — ANZUS, ANZAM, SEATO — whose business had hitherto been with 'armed attack' and whose colour was more Anglo-Saxon than oriental.

As the peripheral lands to her South edged towards 'normal' relations with China, the anti-Communist regional pacts had to be cannibalized if they were not to become obsolete. A moulting SEATO, already shedding members ominously, ceased to be a device for legalizing American military intervention in the area, and started to provide funds for building village schools and digging irrigation ditches and other civic action projects drawn up for the fight against local Communist insurgency. Weighed down by the membership of Taiwan, ASPAC foundered in 1973, when it proved impossible to persuade other partners to hold the overdue eighth ministerial meeting of its Council in such embarrassing company.

Within ASEAN, talk slowly coagulated into joint action on scholarships, fishery promotion, airlines, co-ordination of tourism, standardized spelling, but it soon became obvious that many years would pass before the surface would be solid enough to take any real strain. At the fifth ministerial meeting in April 1972 Lee Kuan Yew pointed out that ASEAN had above all a fine record for inaction. Out of nearly 700 recommendations on regional co-operation that its Foreign Ministers had adopted since 1967, it had implemented precisely eighty. It was nonetheless the only existing syndicate that could translate small-nation diplomacy into concerted international action, and by 1973 it had made the incontrovertible progress that one recognizes more easily in the path of the plodding tortoise than that of the capricious hare."(14)

Both the criticism of and the qualified praise for ASEAN are just, and the criticism needs to be remembered too, especially as favourable public references to the need for closer co-operation be ween ASEAN and the European Communities a now part of the standard pieties of public statemer issuing from political leaders and officials in Brusse or various capital cities of the ASEAN countri whenever the subject of EEC-ASEAN relations raised. Thus, even ASEAN is in some ways remin cent of what was once rather unkindly said of t League of Nations: procrastination was its favour device, it touched nothing that it did not adjour By late 1975, for example, the Joint Study Group up by the EEC and ASEAN earlier in the ye seemed to be languishing. The ASEAN countries h still not yet submitted project papers covering studi of five proposals which the EEC had agreed undertake.

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ANOTHER and more wide-ranging appra of the recent record of regionalist enterprise this part of the world was well summed up in *Far Eastern Economic Review's Asian Yearbook 1975* in the following terms:

> "It was another of those years when Asian regional co-operation failed to make dynamic advances. The underlying instinct towards it remained and the number of regional initials continued to proliferate. While no budding organization came forth with the acronym CULDESAC in many cases it would have been appropriate...It is assumed that the former ECAFE will be bogged down for the next few years in irreconcilable politics. The new look promised by the new Executive Secretary J.B.P. Maramis has yet to take tangible or fruitful expression. But at least ECAFE has appropriately become ESCAP — the Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
>
> At the other end of the scale, small specialized regional co-operation continued to flourish. Thus CULSOGEN and EOCEN (sic) still have some limited life, although ASPAC is dead. SEARCA, SEAFDEC, MEDSEA (sic), SEATAC, SEAMEO and SEAMES — just to mention a few — all pursue separate lives to some effect. The latest is ARTDO (Asian Regional Trade Development Organisation) interesting if only because Taiwan was accepted as a member along with several nations with relations with China.
>
> One often feels a sense of frustration over the various forms of multilateral co-operation. It is difficult finding out who precisely is a member of what, and

what the respective functions are — without ever getting enough facts to form even a tentative conclusion. But many of the activities are useful on a small scale. ESCAP, ILO, FAO, WHO or UNESCO give the UN some practical achievement on the ground denied at the broader organizations and meetings. And the flurry of initials does blunt some of the more abrasive effects of technologically outdated national boundaries.

The fact remains that ASEAN is the one regional organization with the potential to dilute such abrasion."(15)

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ONLY one other relevant organizational factor was left out of this otherwise succinct and listic appraisal. This was the omission of any erence to commodity and other producer "cartels" associations which have sprung up at least as ch within South-east Asia, or as a result of South-t Asian initiatives, as in any other part of the called Third World.

Indonesia is the only South-east Asian member the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-s (OPEC)(16) and has been a member since 1962 indeed, it is the oldest crude oil producer among EC's members; the first oil discovery dates back to 5; commercial production started in 1898 and rently more than forty companies and consortia, stly American, are exploring for and developing production under contract (not concessionary) eements with Pertamina, the national oil com-y. Japan is Indonesia's single largest foreign omer for her oil by far, but Indonesia lost some ts potential oil trade with Japan in 1974-5 partly ause of a cut-back in Japanese demand, but also ause China's prices for oil undercut those of onesia.

Malaysian and Thai interest and involvement the International Tin Council's activities are ious and important to them. In addition to RPC and SEALPA with their predominantly th-east Asian membership and leadership, Thai-l is a member of the Association of Tungsten ducing Countries founded in April 1975, and in tember 1975 there were reports that Indonesia ld probably join Le Conseil Intergouvernemental Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre (CIPEC)(17) first nded in June 1967.

While the actual co-operative measures practised South-east Asian governments in these matters oubtedly are seen primarily in practical and tionally specific terms, Chinese statements ema-ng from Peking have in recent years repeatedly commended the efforts of these former "victims of imperialist plunder" to "struggle to protect prices of raw materials" and to do so by "strengthening bilateral and multilateral co-operation". One typical Chinese statement on this theme during 1975 commends the recent joint efforts of South-east Asian tin and natural rubber producing countries within the general context of "the Third World's struggle against imperialism and hegemonism" and deduced that:

> "From the imperialists', especially the superpowers', practice of profiting at the expense of others, the South-east Asian countries have become increasingly aware that to free themselves from plunder and exploitation and defend their economic rights and interests, they must strengthen their economic co-operation and rely on their collective force to do away with foreign control."(18)

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IT could well be that in the immediate future there will be some serious reappraisal of the role and functions of IGOs within South-east Asia, as in the world at large, given that such organizations have proliferated so rapidly in recent years (as the Glossary clearly shows) with little or no attention having been given to their mutual relationships. There is much to be said for efforts to be concentrated on consolidation and some retrenchment, in attempts to obtain more efficiency and economy of performance. Perhaps a first indication of such a reappraisal was foreshadowed in a meeting convened by the Secretariat of ESCAP in May 1975, bringing together some 100 representatives of about 60 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the ESCAP region together with senior officials of the UN Office of Public Information (OPI) to discuss "Prospects and Realities of Regional Co-operation" at ESCAP headquarters in Bangkok. It was pointed out that the recent ESCAP programme for commodity communities had made some considerable progress, communities having been set up for rubber, coconut and pepper, and "collective arrangements" having also been made for tin, mineral resources and iron and steel. Mention was made of the setting up of an Asian Rice Trade Fund in December 1974 and the project to set up a regional centre for transfer of technology as well as the work of such established regional institutions and facilities as ASEAN, the ADB, the Asian Highway and Mekong projects.

South-east Asia today does not comprise an homogeneous region either functionally or organizationally, nor are there any strong indications that it is becoming such. Increasing interaction between neighbouring countries, of which there is now much evidence, certainly does not necessarily induce trans-

national integration. ASEAN is in an organizational sense "nodal" in terms of regional activities within contemporary South-east Asia, though its capacity and demonstrable will to increase its membership or to engage in fundamentally transformative joint endeavours so far have been conspicuously limited. Singapore is "nodal" within ASEAN in a functional and economic, but not in a political, sense. ASEAN is still a five-headed organization politically rather than having a clear corporate institutionalized personality; but insofar as there is one major political node for ASEAN then this is undoubtedly Jakarta.

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SOME of the psychological barriers which previously stood in the way of inter-ASEAN co-operation have now either been removed or substantially lowered, especially between officials and perhaps between Ministers. ASEAN organization does, however, still remain very much the product of politicians and bureaucrats, and its present character clearly reflects this. Although nowadays unprecedented numbers of people have been mobilized for and are active in politics in South-east Asia, regionalism does not have a markedly popular appeal or an affective and effective ideology to engender mass popularity — with all the ambiguous and volatile expectations and disappointments this can mean.

Is regionalism in South-east Asia going to be better publicized and popularized in the future? What kind of common style, if any, of business and diplomacy might be evolved by the ASEAN countries? What will or should ASEAN's relations be with the many other burgeoning regional organizations of South-east Asia? To date ASEAN's major achievements have been the negative but significant ones of tranquillizing troublesome relations between its members which might otherwise have been much more actively or potentially disruptive. It is in this relatively unpublicized role as a dampener, and perhaps even as a resolver, of conflict between its members that ASEAN's major contribution has lain.

It seems very unlikely that participation in regionalist schemes will do very much that is decisive to increase the internal cohesion and authority of present incumbent governments in the eyes of their own populaces. Nevertheless, active and perhaps even merely formal participation in regional organization is at least an indication of a disposition to co-operate rather than to conflict, to settle disagreement peaceably rather than by the arbitrament of force, with one's co-members. The existence of regional organizations and their demonstrable functioning is not a guarantee against local tensions, rivalries and armed clashes, but it is likely to be an indication that such tensions and rivalries as are latent or which erupt will be contained so long as the parties continue to attach some importance to their co-membership in the regional organization. Even so, it needs to be remembered that, in general, current regionalist enterprises in South-east Asia (even more markedly than in the single case of ASEAN), involve only the occasional and part-time pre-occupation of a few top officials and politicians within each of their member countries and that the resources invested in them, especially of finance and personnel, are still small relative to the overall capacities of each member government.

Regionalist policies in international politics are primarily the projection and expression of the national policies of incumbent governments when promoted by Powers intrinsic or extrinsic to the region. There are at least five ASEANs: that is to say five ways of regarding and using ASEAN depending on whether one is operating and evaluating ASEAN from Jakarta, Manila, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur or Bangkok. And ASEAN, whatever its shortcomings, is a club exclusively for South-East Asian countries, formed and sustained principally by local initiatives. Neither the United States, China, nor Japan, nor the Soviet Union has acted or is likely to be able to act, as the generally accepted manager of the regional order of South-east Asia. The quality of that order now depends principally on ASEAN and on Vietnam.

There is no decisive evidence to show that regionalist associations are now of paramount importance in South-east Asia, clearly preponderating over general IGOs, commodity associations or even bilateral diplomatic networks. Indeed, what is most striking is that those countries which send and receive relatively numerous and large diplomatic establishments, compared with some of their neighbours, are also and simultaneously more likely to maintain a larger number of memberships in IGOs than their less internationally activist neighbours. Thus we can say that diplomatic representation patterns and memberships of IGOs tend to be roughly (not precisely) mutually reinforcing. Any South-east Asian country which is active in regionalist endeavours nowadays is likely to be fairly active on the general global stage; whereas a country which is rather inactive or isolationist internationally is likely to be like this at the regional level as well.

Most writing about recent and contemporary regionalism in South-east Asia seems swiftly to gravitate to one or another extreme: either regionalism is represented as a source of sweetness and light leading states and peoples away from narrow nationalistic prejudices and perspectives into a world of greater inter-dependencies and increasing community, or else it seems to reflect a Gibbonian register of the crimes, follies, misfortunes — as well as deceptions and self-delusions — of man. In fact, the record briefly examined in this paper seems to provide no strong endorsement for either pole.

(As of 1974)

	Date of Independence	Date of Joining UN	IAEA	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	WHO	IBRD/IMF	ICAO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IFC	IMCO	GATT
Burma	1948	1948	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Cambodia	1954	1955	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*
Indonesia	1945-50	1950	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Laos	1954	1955	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	-	-
Malaysia (or Malaya)	1957	1957	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Papua New Guinea	1975	1975													
Philippines	1946	Original member	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-
Singapore	1965	1965	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Thailand	Pre 1945	1946	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-
Vietnam	1945-75														
North	1954	Not													
South	1954-75	members													

IAEA ..... International Atomic Energy Agency
ILO ..... International Labour Organization (see Glossary)
FAO ..... Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (see Glossary)
UNESCO ..... United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WHO ..... World Health Organization
IBRD/IMF ..... International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Monetary Fund
ICAO ..... International Civil Aviation Organization (see Glossary)
UPU ..... Universal Postal Union
ITU ..... International Telecommunication Union (see Glossary)
WMO ..... World Meteorological Organization
IFC ..... International Finance Corporation
IMCO ..... Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
GATT ..... General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Glossary

ABU — *Asian Broadcasting Union.* Founded 1964, Sydney.

ACC — *Asian Coconut Community.* Formed in 1973. Members: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Western Samoa.

ADB — *Asian Development Bank.* Founded 1966. Headquarters in Manila. Members (January 1975): 41 countries, 27 of them Asian, including Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand and Papua New Guinea. See also ADF, SEATAC.

ADF — *Asian Development Fund.* Launched June 1974 as a vehicle through which ADB can make loans on concessional terms for development projects and programmes to members in Asia and the Pacific, with special regard to the most needy. Initial fund pledged by 10 "developed" ADB members: Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, the US, West Germany.

AIC — *Asian Investment Centre.* Proposed via ECAFE, 1972, now under ESCAP.

AIDC — *Asian Industrial Development Council.* Under the aegis of ESCAP.

AIEDP — *Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning.* Founded 1964, Bangkok, under the auspices of ECAFE (now ESCAP) as a regional staff college of the United Nations, supported by ESCAP member countries and the *United Nations' Development Programme* (UNDP).

AIEPA — *Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration.* Founded 1962, New Delhi. Sponsored by UNESCO. Has 19 Asian members.

AIR — *Asian Institute of Technology.* Founded 1959, Bangkok, as SEATO Graduate School of Engineering. Became an independent institution with its present name in 1967.

AMDA — *Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement.* Formed in 1957, London, Superseded in 1971 by ANZUK.

ANRPC — *Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries.* Founded 1970, Kuala Lumpur. Members include Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand.

ANZAM — An informal agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, made in 1949, to co-ordinate their defence planning, extended in 1955 to cover the defence of Malaya, and then subsumed in ANZUK.

ANZUK — Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom associated together in joint command and control arrangements for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore. Formally launched in 1971 and now being phased out.

ANZUS — Australia, New Zealand and the United St[ates]. Tripartite treaty of alliance and mutual s[ecu]rity, launched in 1951, and of indef[inite] duration.

APO — *Asian Productivity Organization.* 14 mem[bers] countries. Originated May 1961 in Manila a first meeting of producers held in M[anila] 1959 in Tokyo.

APU — *Asian Parliamentary Union.* (Not to be [con]fused with a Filipino proposal for an *A[sian] Payments Union*). Originated in 1965 in To[kyo].

ARTDO — *Asian Regional Trade Development Organ[iza]tion.*

ASA — *Association of Southeast Asia,* 1961-7. M[em]. (Malaysia), the Philippines and Thailand.

ASAIHL — *Association of South-east Asian Institute[s] Higher Learning.* 51 member universities[/] colleges by 1974.

ASEAN — *Association of Southeast Asian Nat[ions].* Launched at Bangkok in 1969. Mem[bers]: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa[pore], Thailand. (Three other South-east Asian [states] — Cambodia, Laos and South Vietna[m] have on occasions sent representatives to m[in]terial meetings of ASEAN but only as obs[ervers] and only after first receiving a clear invi[tation] to attend a specific meeting by the government. Burma and North Vietnam hitherto declined such invitations).

In May 1974 it was agreed to establ[ish] permanent ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. [The] detailed preparatory work of ASEAN is don[e] eleven Permanent Committees, each with[out] ponsibility for specific tasks — e.g. ship[ping] food and agriculture, tourism, transport[ation] and telecommunications, sciences and te[ch]nology, and socio-cultural. There are also s[ix] special committees. The best known and [per]haps most important is the *Special Co-ord[in]ating Committee of ASEAN Nations* [*S.C.A.N.*] set up in June 1972 to seek tariff conce[ssions] from the EEC. In August 1975 the me[mbers] agreed to set up an Inter-parliamentary [Or]ganization.

ASEAN-CCI — *Conference of the ASEAN Chambers of [Com]merce and Industry.* Inaugurated 1974.

ASIAN HIGHWAY (TTB) — *Asian Highway* [*Transport Technical Bur[eau]*]. An ESCAP-related body.

ASPAC — *Asian and Pacific Council.* Founded Seoul. Original members: Australia (did[n't] attend ministerial meetings after 1972 [and] subsequently withdrew from CULSO[A], FFTC, and RSTS), Japan, Malaysia (with[drew] in 1973), New Zealand, the Philippines, S[outh] Korea, South Vietnam (ceased member[ship] April 1975), Taiwan and Thailand. Stan[ding] Committee rotates among member coun[tries].

There has been no meeting of the Council since 1972. Subsidiary bodies: CULSOGEN (Cultural and Social Centre, Seoul 1968-9); ECOGEN (Economic Co-operation Centre, Bangkok, 1971); FFTC (Food and Fertiliser Technology Centre, Taipei, 1970); RSTS (Registry of Scientific and Technical Services, Canberra 1968). By mid-1975 ASPAC was inactive.

COP — *Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas.* An ESCAP-related body.

AFEA-ICC — *Commission on Asian and Far Eastern Affairs* of the *International Chamber of Commerce.* Founded 1952, Bangkok.

lombo Plan — *The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia.* Founded 1950, Colombo. Has 18 Asian and Pacific member countries and donors. Donors include Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States.

LSOGEN — See ASPAC.

AFE — *Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East,* a regional Commission of the UN. Founded 1947, Shanghai. Permanent headquarters, Bangkok. Renamed and superseded by ESCAP in 1974.

CAP — *Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.* Launched January 1975. Headquarters, Bangkok. Thirty members (including Burma, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam and Thailand, with Brunei and Papua New Guinea among its associate members — the latter becoming a full member after independence in September 1975).

Four regional institutions operate under the auspices of ESCAP: the *Asian Centre for Training and Research in Social Welfare and Development,* in Manila; the *Asian Development Institute,* in Bangkok; the *Asian Statistical Institute,* in Tokyo; and the *Asian Centre for Development Administration,* in Kuala Lumpur.

O — *Food and Agricultural Organization.* Asian regional office, Bangkok.

C — See ASPAC.

D — *International Bank for Reconstruction and Development* (World Bank). Asian regional office: Tokyo, since 1970.

ICAO — *International Civil Aviation Organization.* Asian regional office, Bangkok.

ILO — *International Labour Organization.* Asian regional office, Bangkok.

ITU — *International Telecommunication Union.* ESCAP — ITU Unit, c/o ESCAP, Bangkok.

MAPHILINDO — (**Ma**laysia, **Philippines**, **Indo**nesia) Stillborn 1963.

Mekong Committee — *Mekong River Development Project,* Bangkok. Founded 1961. Riparian members: Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam. 26 co-operating countries.

MCEDSEA — *Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia.* Formed 1966. Participating countries: ASEAN nations, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Japan.

SEAMEO — *Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization.* Formed 1965, Bangkok. Permanent secretariat (SEAMES) in Bangkok.

SEATAC — *Southeast Asian Agency for Transport and Communications.* Inaugurated in 1966 in Bangkok by Malaysia and Thailand.

SEATO — *South-east Asia Treaty Organization.* Brought into being as a result of the signing of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact) in Manila, September 1954. Headquarters, Bangkok. Membership: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (withdrew 1972), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Also, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were declared to be under SEATO defence 'protection'. Cambodia repudiated its links with SEATO in 1956, Laos as a result of the Geneva agreement of 1962 and South Vietnam in effect by the events culminating in April 1975.

There are a number of formerly SEATO-sponsored institutions and offshoots. By late 1975 SEATO was officially being "phased out".

SEAISI — *South-east Asian Iron and Steel Institute.* Founded 1970, following the recommendations of a mission set up by ECAFE.

SEALPA — *Southeast Asia Lumber Producers' Association.* Founded December 1974. Members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines.

Notes and References

1. For some general scholarly discussions of regional organizations, see for example, Ronald Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order* (Public Affairs Press, Washington DC, 1965); Bruce Russett, *International Relations and the International System* (Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1967); Joseph S. Nye Jr., *International Regionalism: Readings* (Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1970); Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1970); Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, (eds.), *Regional Politics and World Order* (W.H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1973); and the special issue of *International Journal* (Toronto, vol. XXX No. 4, Autumn 1975) entitled "Regionalism". None of these works is specifically concerned with South-east Asia which tends to be neglected as a case study in general surveys and evaluations, certainly by comparison with Europe or even with Africa or Latin America.

2. For a recent expository textbook treatment see Richard Muir, *Modern Political Geography* (The MacMillan Press Ltd., London, 1975), especially Parts 2, 3 and 8.

3. For the view that it is not genuinely a region but a mere geographical expression see Richard Harris's several articles in *The Times,* especially "In the Wrong Bundle", 22 February 1965. For a review of this theme from the standpoint of a political geographer and for an argument that South-east Asia does properly constitute a region see Charles A. Fisher, "The Contribution of Geography to Foreign Area Studies: the case of Southeast Asia" in *Geographers Abroad,* ed. by Marvin W. Mikesell (The University of Chicago Dept. of Geography Research Paper No. 152). More neutral appraisals from the standpoint of students of international politics may be found in Peter Lyon, *War and Peace in Southeast Asia* (Oxford UP for RIIA, 1969) and Michael Leifer, *Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia* (Asia/Pacific Press, 1973).

4. The styles, scope and significance of diplomacy and patterns of diplomatic representation in South-east Asia is still a subject lacking systematic treatment. But some aspects are illuminated by: Russell H. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945-1958* (Harper, New York 1958) especially Chapter 3, "The Machinery of Statehood"; Peter J. Boyce, "The Machinery of Southeast Asian Regional Diplomacy" in *New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia. The Great Powers and Southeast Asia* (hereafter *ND*) edited by Lau Teik Soon (Singapore University Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973) pp. 173-185. In my view the three best single country studies bearing on this subject, though very different in style and scope, are: Robert O. Tilman *Malaysian Foreign Policy* (Research Analysis Corporation, McLean Virginia, March 1969); Frank H. King, "The Foreign Policy of Singapore" in R.P. Barston (ed.), *The Foreign Policies of Other Powers* (Allen & Unwin, 1972) and Pacifico A. Castro, *Philippine Diplomatic and Consular Practice* (UST Co-operative, Manila, 1965).

5. See Peter Lyon, *War and Peace in Southeast Asia, op. cit.,* Chapter 8, especially pp. 216-21.

6. See J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi: The Indonesian-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (OUP, Kuala Lumpur, 1975).

7. See Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organisations" in *World Politics,* vol. 19(4), July 1967, pp. 646-663.

8. The next three paragraphs closely correspond to the aut earlier article, "ASEAN and the future of regionalism" in *Directions in the International Relations of Southeast The Great Powers and Southeast Asia,* edited by Lau Soon (Singapore University Press for the Institute of S east Asian Studies, 1973).

9. For a detailed account of ECAFE until 1955 see Davi Wightman, *Toward Economic Co-operation in Asia: United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the East* (New Haven, Yale UP 1963). ECAFE was founde 1947 in China with only four original Asian members headquarters were moved to Bangkok in 1949. L.P. S *The Politics of Economic Co-operation in Asia: a Stu Asian International Organisations* (Columbia, Universit Missouri Press, 1966) is mostly about ECAFE and the C bo Plan.

10. See Peter Lyon, "SEATO in Perspective" in *The Yearbo World Affairs,* 1965, pp. 113-36 and Peter Lyon, "Subst for SEATO" in *International Journal* (Toronto, W 1968-69), pp. 35-46.

11. See Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in S east Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966); Peter *War and Peace in Southeast Asia, op. cit.,* pp. 15 and Werner Levi, *The Challenge of World Politics in and Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Chapter 3.

12. There is still no full length and scholarly study of AS but some aspects of it are discussed in Peter Lyon, "A and the future of regionalism", *op. cit.,* and in Michael "The ASEAN states and the progress of regional co-oper in Southeast Asia" in *Politics, Society and Economy in the A States,* edited by Dahm & Draguhn (Otto Harrassowitz baden, 1975). The weekly journal, *The Far Eastern Eco Review,* published from Hong Kong, is the best regular s of news and comment on ASEAN.

13. Dennis Bloodworth, *An Eye for the Dragon. Southeast Observed 1954-73* (Penguin Books edition, Harmondsw 1975) pp. 368-9.

14. Bloodworth, *op. cit.,* pp. 369-70.

15. *The Far Eastern Economic Review Asian Yearbook* (Hong Kong), p. 68.

16. See Abdul Amir Q. Kubbah, *OPEC Past and Present* (H economic Research Centre, Vienna, September 1974).

17. See, e.g. *Indonesian News,* issued by the Information D Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, London, v No. 64., Sept. 75, p. 15. And for an informed discussi copper in general see Sir Ronald Lindsay Prain, *Copper anatomy of an Industry* (Mining Journal Books Ltd., Lo 1975) see especially Chapter "CIPEC: The Developing C tries and the Copper Market". CIPEC so far has only fou member-countries, i.e. copper exporting countries, and controls 45 per cent of the world copper market.

18. *Peking Review,* No. 25., 20 June 1975, p. 19; c.f. *P Review,* No. 39., 26 September, 1975 p. 24.

)NGOLIA: *The Soviet Union has successfully turned Mongolia, formerly a devout Buddhist monarchy, into its first fully-fledged Communist satellite in Asia. Here, the author provides an account of Russia's struggle with China for control of Mongolia.*

Mongolia between the Soviet Union and People's China

André Tong

MONGOLIA is at the geographical heart of the Asian continent, hemmed in to the North by the former Russo-Mongol territory of Trans-kalia, known today as the "Soviet Autonomous riat-Mongol Republic", and to the South by the nese Mongol territories of "Inner Mongolia". tegically the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) ds an all-important position in the event of flict between Russia and China. Several Chinese mic installations as well as China's most important lear missile sites are within reach of Soviet/Mon- missile launching pads. The Gobi Desert could ly be crossed by Soviet/Mongol tanks invading the ple's Republic of China (PRC) across the Auto- nous Region of Inner Mongolia. The highly itive strategic location of the country is obvious. s is what prompted one of Prince Sihanouk's s to remark in Ulan Bator in the early 1960s: "If Third World War breaks out, it will break out Mongolia."

The MPR with its 1,531,000 square kilometre and with a population of approximately 0,000, represents a trump card whose value both Soviet Union and the PRC are only too aware of.

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THE rivalry between these two Powers over Mongolia does not date from the Sino-Soviet ute but belongs to history. After the dismantling Genghis Khan's empire, which, in the thirteenth ury stretched from the shores of the Pacific in East to the banks of the Vistula in the West, ngolia became the theatre of confrontation een Russians and Chinese in the second part of seventeenth century. Time and again Mongolia submitted to the influence of China or Russia.

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THE Chinese Revolution of 1911, which put an end to the Manchu dynasty, led Mongolia to proclaim its independence. As a vassal state of the Manchu Emperor, Mongolia lived under a Buddhist theocracy (based on Lamaistic Buddhism, as in Tibet), with the **Khutuktu** ("the reincarnate one") at its head, backed by Mongol princes. These rulers refused to recognize the new Chinese Republic. They considered themselves absolved from their oath of allegiance to the deposed Emperor and elected the **Khutuktu,** Jebtsun Damba, as sovereign.

It was not long before the Chinese reacted. A Chinese resident with full powers was installed in the Mongolian capital, at that time called Urga. He was shortly followed by an entire military division. Considering his country threatened, the **Khutuktu** secretly sent a princely delegation to the Tsar asking him to intervene militarily. This would have irrevocably upset the fragile international equilibrium in this part of the world. But finally war was averted and the diplomats had the last word. A Russo-Mongol agreement was signed at Urga in 1912 and during the next year, Russian and Chinese plenipotentiaries in Peking put their signatures to a joint convention concerning Mongolia.

In the two treaties signed, Mongolia was officially recognized as an autonomous state, although nominally non-independent. In the first treaty, Russia agreed to come to the assistance of Mongolia in all circumstances. Mongolia obtained the right to create a national army and to refuse Chinese troops and settlers access to its territory. Moreover, Russia was granted the status of "privileged nation" in bilateral trade, while the Urga Government was banned from signing any treaty with China or other Powers without the prior consent of the Imperial Russian Government. Under the terms of

the second accord, China agreed not to send troops to Mongolia under any circumstances, not to keep military or civilian officials in the country, and not to embark on any form of colonization. Nevertheless China preserved a purely nominal right of suzerainty in Mongolia in the form of an envoy in Urga, but who did not have any actual powers.

As a result of these accords, Chinese troops withdrew from Mongolia, while the **Khutuktu,** disappointed at the non-recognition of his country's independence, decided to form a national army equipped with modern weaponry. It was at this time that people in the sovereign's entourage began to be aware of a young, russophil Mongol officer, Sukhe Bator, who was given the command of the first cavalry unit to be supplied with machine guns.

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WITH characteristic obduracy, the Chinese patiently waited for the moment of revenge and, taking advantage of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, invaded Mongolia in 1919, in flagrant violation of the signed convention. Two Chinese divisions occupied Urga and disarmed the Mongol troops. The Chinese generals did not hesitate to commit the sacrilege of arresting the **Khutuktu.** Lieutenant Sukhe Bator refused to succumb to the Chinese *coup.* Before the Chinese had time to reach his cavalry headquarters, he evacuated his men and arms to an area far from the capital. To avoid being trapped, Sukhe Bator moved North, recruiting shepherds and peasants on the way. These then formed the nucleus of a revolutionary movement whose initial objective was to chase out the occupying force and restore sovereign power to the **Khutuktu.** Hard pressed by Chinese troops, Sukhe Bator and his partisans penetrated Soviet territory. It was there that Sukhe Bator met his compatriot, Horloogiyn Choibalsang, the leader of another resistance movement. They decided to unite to form one single revolutionary organization, despite the disparate ideologies of the two movements, that of Sukhe Bator being purely nationalist, while that of Choibalsang was under Moscow's remote control. The political conversion of Sukhe Bator was probably the work of Choibalsang who inculcated him with Marxist doctrine and tactics. The young officer was soon persuaded that the declaration on Mongolia issued by Lenin's Government in 1918 conformed to his objective for Mongolian independence:

> "Mongolia is a free country. Executive and judicial power should belong to the Mongolian people. Not a single foreigner has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Mongolia. As an independent country, Mongolia has the right to relations with all peoples without recourse to the tutelage of Peking or Petrograd."

In their search for help, Sukhe Bator a Choibalsang turned to Bolshevik Russia. In 192 small delegation of the "Mongolian Revolution Party" (MRP) arrived at Soviet outposts. T delegation, composed of only five members, was by Sukhe Bator assisted by Choibalsang(1). The th other members were two monks, the Lama Chagd jav, who was a conservative, and the Lama Bodo former Marxist employee of the Imperial Russ consulate at Urga, and a petty functionary nam Danzan. They were conducted to Moscow wh Lenin received them in person and sent them study on a political education course, run by Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Pa During their four-month stay they were not allow to leave Moscow. Then they were taken to Irkut There, with Moscow's authorization, they found the "Mongolia Liberation Committee". It was also Soviet soil that *Unen* or the "Pravda of Mongol was edited; this was the official organ of the MR This Party had its first congress in March 1 under Danzan's chairmanship and, in the presence 20 delegates, the Party decided to join the Th International. Sukhe Bator became commander chief of the "Mongolian Revolutionary Army" wh consisted of 10,000 horsemen under Soviet instr tors. But neither the "Mongolia Liberation Comm tee" nor the Revolutionary Army could claim to actually **defending** the interests of their cou because they did not have an inch of Mo territory in their possession. They were at this t fighting the White Russian troops of Baron Ung von Sternberg, which were finally decimated by Red Army and Sukhe Bator's horsemen. Eventu however the last element of Chinese resistance Mongolia was stamped out.

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ONE sees then the beginning of a Commu process which was later emulated in sev other countries: the transformation from "libera committee" to "provisional government", and t from "coalition government" to definitive Com nist government. The Lama Bodo became head the Provisional Government, with Danzan, Mini of Justice, and Sukhe Bator, Minister of War(2). spite of the respectful message which this Gov ment sent to the **Khutuktu,** finally liberated in wake of the Chinese defeat, the sovereign denied legitimacy of Bodo's Government and ordered Su Bator and his men to put down their arms. At t Moscow unleashed a press campaign against Urga Government, providing the international P with "proof" of the "counter-revolutionary brutal of the **Khutuktu's** Government. On 26 June 1 the Soviet Fifth Army penetrated Mongolia. Bo Provisional Government was installed at Urga, wh it later became a Coalition Government, but did survive a bloody purge in which Bodo as well numerous members of the **Khutuktu's** entour

ere killed. On 22 February 1923 Sukhe Bator, cked with TB, died suddenly. According to the ficial version given in Urga and Moscow he was isoned by a Lama doctor. The old sacred capital Urga was then renamed Ulan Bator in honour of e revolutionary chief.

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IN ORDER to consolidate complete control, the Mongolian Communists had to neutralize liquidate certain opponents. The most important these was without doubt the **Khutuktu:** they had t forgotten the attitude he had adopted vis-à-vis e Provisional Government. Given the Sovereign's cred status, the Mongol Communists sensibly de- ded to avoid the mistake of committing sacrilege as e Chinese had done previously, and settled to await e death of the aged monarch. This took place on May 1924 and the "Great Hural" (Parliament) ted on 13 June to abolish the monarchy and to ablish a lay "People's Republic". In order not to fend the profoundly pious population, the MRP uited a further two years to study and debate the oblem of reincarnation. In 1926, the Fifth Con- ess of the MRP adopted the following resolution:

> "Regarding the nomination of a new **Khutuktu** to succeed the one who died in 1924, we cannot find any instruction in the sacred texts. And so the institution is hereby suspended, until a detailed investigation of the question at the highest possible level of the Buddhist hierarchy can provide a solution."

This has still not been found 50 years after at Congress!

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AMONG the enemies of the Moscow-oriented Mongol Communists were two men whose esence was no longer welcome to the new leaders. e first, Danzan, was quickly disposed of: accused being leader of the right wing of the Party, anzan was arrested on 30 August 1924 during a rsion of the Third Congress of the MRP and ecuted. Two years later, Dambadorj, President of e Executive Central Committee and President of e Council of Ministers, was accused at the Eighth rty Congress of having formed a rightist govern- ent. He was arrested and shot.

One of the original Marxists, Choibalsang urned from Moscow, where he had studied politics a further two years, and eventually took charge the Government. He reassured the population by tting an end to the bloody purges, and by showing mself to be a good administrator. Closely following oscow's line, Choibalsang undertook the moderniza- tion of Mongolia with the help of Soviet aid. He presided over the construction of hospitals endowed with the most recent medical and surgical techniques, and wasted no time in promoting Mongolia's industrialization. At the same time, on the foreign affairs front, he recognized Mao Tse-tung's young PRC on 6 October 1949. At home Choibalsang encouraged research into all aspects of Mongol culture. He introduced the Cyrillic alphabet into the secondary schools and universities. While remaining all the time a pure Marxist devoted to Moscow, Choibalsang, at the same time, was so devoutly nationalistic that the Great Hural dubbed him "Hero of People's Mongolia" and gave him the rank of marshal. One might well ask whether Choibalsang's popularity did not arouse Stalin's suspicion, for it was never really explained why Choibalsang made the Ulan Bator-Moscow journey in midwinter for an appendicitis operation, while he could presumably have had this simple operation in the very modern hospital of Ulan Bator. On the 26 January 1952, *Tass* announced Choibalsang's death as a result of the operation.

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HIS successor, Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, a technician born in 1915 and educated in the Soviet Union, had been secretary of the Central Committee of the MRP in 1940, and then Secretary-General of the Party before achieving power(3). An economist by training, he tried to follow his predecessor's policies in all domains. Meanwhile Moscow was quick to make Tsedenbal understand that, in order to survive, Mongolia should behave as a satellite country, blindly obeying the USSR. And so, when the Sino-Soviet accords were signed in Peking in 1954, we learn that the common decision of the two signatories to extend the Irkutsk-Naushki-Ulan Bator railway line to Peking, was taken without even consulting Tsedenbal, Head of State of a so-called "independent" country. In compensation for this slight to Mongolia's *amour-propre,* the Soviet Union two years later ceded to Mongolia without indemnification the installations of the petroleum trust **Mongol Neft,** erected in Mongolia at Soviet expense by Soviet technicians. The joint Soviet-Mongol communiqué of 15 March 1957 states that in ten years (1947-57) the USSR granted Mongolia credits to the value of US$225 million.

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SOVIET policy with regard to Mongolia is a modernized version of Tsarist policy: to ensure, by all means possible, a good strategic position vis-à-vis China. This policy has, in the course of the last few years, been applied on all fronts, — diplomatic, political, economic and military.

The Soviet Union sponsored the MPR's entry

into the United Nations on 27 October 1961, on the strength of which some 60 countries have recognized Mongolia. In exchange the MPR has always shown itself to be one of the most enthusiastic promoters of the Soviet proposal for a system of collective security in Asia.

In 1962 Mongolia became a full member of COMECON replacing Albania and reinforcing its political and economic links with the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe. In internal affairs the Mongolian constitution of 1960 made no attempt to conceal the country's wholesale alignment with the USSR. One of the articles of this constitution stipulated that every citizen "should, by all means possible, reinforce the unity and cohesion of the peoples of the socialist camp, at the head of which is the Soviet Union".

This was without doubt the reason why members of the Politburo and the Central Committee were excluded for "nationalism", an accusation meaning simply — opposition to Mongolia's dependence on Moscow. This was particularly true in the cases of D. Tömör-ochir, a secretary of the Central Committee dismissed in 1962, and L. Tsend, a secretary of the Central Committee dismissed in 1963.

Tsedenbal, himself, was not immune from the vicissitudes of Soviet policy. In 1957 Moscow, then on good terms with Peking, did nothing to defend him against Damba who presented the report indicting the Prime Minister at the Thirteenth Party Congress. In 1958 Tsedenbal was relieved of his functions as Secretary-General and Prime Minister, owing to his disastrous economic and agricultural policies. Tsedenbal came back to power at the end of 1958 but, in 1961, was obliged to deliver a self-criticism for not having denounced personality cults and for having supported Choibalsang's personality cult. At the Twenty Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, according to *Pravda*, he made a "much applauded speech" in favour of de-Stalinization, but Moscow did not heed this and continued to rebuke him. Eleven years later, when the MPR's President, Z. Sambuu, died, Moscow showed that it had forgotten nothing. A little more than two years was needed to choose a new Mongolian Head of State, a post which Tsedenbal thought should have devolved to him again. He had to wait for the green light from Moscow to obtain it and it was not until 11 June 1974 that he was appointed President of the Praesidium of the Party's Central Committee or in other words, President of the Republic. On the same day another Politburo member, S. Luvsan, became Vice-President of the Praesidium. A third member of the Party hierarchy, Batmounk, was named Prime Minister in place of Tsedenbal. In this reshuffle one of the most important posts in all Communist parties, that of President of the Party's Control Commission, fell Luvsanravdan, a doctrinaire Moscow faithful, 1 vice-Prime Minister Maydar and the three Cent Committee secretaries, — Jagvarol, Ialan-Ajav a Molomjamts.

Mongolia has long been ideologically align with the Soviet Union. Thus at the time of "pre-summit" held in Budapest on 26 February 19 at the instigation of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, in anticipation of a World Conferer of 88 Communist parties scheduled to condemn PRC, the MRP delegation was one of the delegations which responded to the invitation.

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IN 1932 the Soviet Union realized that M golia was bordering on economic collapse a that the USSR's substantial investments in country were at risk. The Soviet Government did cut off the flow of aid to Mongolia as a result of but sent Soviet officials to administer the aid on ground. From 1961 Mongolian commerce with Soviet Union accounted for 68.7% of Mongol foreign trade. Trade with COMECON count represents 95% of Mongolian trade of wh two thirds is with the Soviet Union; Mongol imports from COMECON countries stand at ne twice the value of its exports to those countr Soviet aid to Mongolia under the present 5-year p rose to US$700 million. The Soviet-Mongol ag ment signed in February 1973 stipulated that ec mic agencies of the two countries should work close co-operation with one another, and particul in the exploitation of Mongolian copper and mo denum deposits near Ulan Bator.

The industrialization of Mongolia launc under Choibalsang has continued. On 30 Ma 1964 Tsedenbal signed a new agreement w Moscow which allowed for a greater flow of So technicians and engineers as well as construct materials and lorries. This agreement was prima designed to bring about an acceleration in development of industry, especially the Soviet-Mon complex of Darkhan with its power station, wh has an annual production capacity of 150, Kilowatts.

This has led to a boom in the population Darkhan which has increased from 25,000 inh tants in 1965 to 40,000 in 1968, and which pa the 60,000 mark in 1975. Mongolian and Rus workers at Mongolia's chief industrial centre grouped together in military cadres. One ca enter Darkhan without a special pass. The mining centre of Charen Gol, where annual pro tion is 1 million tons, was set up not far f Darkhan. In the North and East of the country Governments of Ulan Bator and Moscow envisage

reation of new industrial centres. The two most nportant will be based on the Darkhan model and ill be called Sukhe Bator and Choibalsang.

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FINALLY, on the military side Soviet influence in Mongolia is preponderant. From 12-18 nuary 1966 Leonid Brezhnev, accompanied by Marshal Malinowski, the then Russian Defence linister, went to Ulan Bator where he signed a new 0-year Treaty of Friendship and Aid with Tseden-al. Article 5 of this document states:

> "The contracting parties will consult one another on the most important international problems affecting the interests of the two countries or the interests of peace and international collaboration. Acting according to the spirit of their traditional friendship and conforming to the UN charter, they will take jointly all necessary measures, **including military measures,** necessary to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries."

his Article 5 of the Soviet-Mongol Treaty did not ss unnoticed in the PRC, no less so than the less blicized pronouncements of Mongol military lead-s. The publication on 30 July 1964 in *Red Star,* e official organ of the Soviet Defence Ministry, of article by Colonel Tsend Ayouch, head of the litical department of the Mongolian Army, makes attempt to hide the two countries' intentions:

> "Our Army is capable of carrying out all missions that the people entrust to it. Mongol troops will defend the sacred frontiers of the socialists camp. Henceforth the boundary between Mongolia and China marks the frontier of the socialist camp, and there we have mounted sacred guard. Thanks to the aid of Soviet instructors, the calibre of Mongol troops has passed in a few years from the stage of mere horsemen to that of motorized infantry."

A few months after the signature of the new viet — Mongol Treaty, on 24 March 1966, General hagvasüren, Mongolian Defence Minister, wrote an ticle on the modernization of the Mongol Army. his article, published by the daily newspaper Mongol News", edited in Russian in Ulan Bator, vealed that "thanks to the aid of the Soviet Union d Soviet armed forces, the People's Army has come a highly mechanized and highly renovated rmy. It possesses the latest weaponry and, most portant, the most modern rockets available."

On 7 November 1967, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, Soviet units paraded for the first time in the streets of Ulan Bator, with Mongolian troops riding tanks and carriers on which Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles were mounted. In the same year reliable estimates of Soviet forces in Mongolia gave the figure of 17 divisions. Mongolia's defence system has continued to improve. After the Chinese H-bomb detonation of June 1967 a whole anti-missile protection system was thrown around Ulan Bator, similar to that which protects Moscow.

Since the signing of the Soviet-Mongol Treaty of 1966, Soviet military delegations have visited Mongolia frequently. The most significant of these visits was that made by Marshal Andrei Grechko in September 1970. The Soviet Defence Minister was accompanied by a number of officers whose presence indicated the importance which Moscow attached to this visit. Marshal Grechko was accompanied on this visit, which took him to the very border with China, by Army General Alexis Epichev, head of the political department of the USSR armed forces, Air Marshal Paul Katukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and General Paul Komarovski, Vice-Minister of Defence, charged with logistics. This visit of top level Soviet military personnel allowed them to see for themselves the construction of fortifications along the length of the border with the PRC which was mentioned in the text of the new Soviet-Mongol agreements.

Apart from the presence in Mongolia of Soviet troops belonging to the Army and the Air Force, Soviet military assistance to Mongolia also includes air cover. Since October 1964 Soviet AN 204 jets have reinforced Mongolian civil aviation. Also, electronic installations were set up in the mountains to the East of Ulan Bator. Finally, since 1970, Soviet rocket bases have been erected near Lake Buir, on the Manchurian frontier, 800 kilometres from Ulan Bator.

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CONFRONTED by the increasing "satellization" of Mongolia, the PRC has not failed to react. The Chinese still consider that Mongolia was a Chinese province from 1691-1911 and again from 1919-21. In 1936 Mao Tse-tung wrote:

> "When the revolution achieves victory in China, the Republic of Outer Mongolia will automatically and of its own volition become a member of the Chinese Federation."

When he wrote these lines Mao was still far from power. The Mongolia question was settled by Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek after the Yalta Confer-

ence. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed on 14 August 1945 in Moscow included a clause referring to Mongolia, which stipulated that the inhabitants of this country would decide through a referendum whether they would maintain their independence or whether they would return to Chinese sovereignty. This plebiscite, supervised by the Soviets, took place on 20 October 1945, with 98% of the adult population participating. The Mongol voters came out 100 per cent in favour of independence; and Chiang Kai-shek's Government officially recognized Mongolia's independence on 5 January 1946.

But Stalin refused to let Choibalsang unite Inner and Outer Mongolia as one unified state. In spite of the political activity of the Inner Mongolian revolutionaries, wishing to follow the example of their fellow Mongols in Outer Mongolia, Choibalsang's dream of creating a "Great Mongolia" was never realized. The 3,000,000 inhabitants of Inner Mongolia were colonized by 4,500,000 Chinese, and many were transferred to other provinces of China.

The Government of Taipei on 26 February 1953 officially denounced the Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, including the clause on independent Mongolia, still considering it as a Chinese province.

The PRC, recognized by the Ulan Bator Government since 1949, officially abandoned the traditional Chinese suzerainty stand on Mongolia in 1950. To begin with, Sino-Mongol relations were characterized by goodwill on the part of both Peking and Ulan Bator.

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THE introduction of the Russian alphabet in Inner Mongolia in 1955 allowed the inhabitants of this Autonomous Region to correspond with their kinsmen in the MPR. In 1956 the Peking Government sent 40,000 Chinese workers to Mongolia to take part in irrigation and construction projects as part of the "non-repayable aid" scheme which amounted to US$40 million. Two years later, on 28 December 1958, the Ulan Bator Government, at that time led by Damba who was considered pro-Chinese, obtained a US$25 million loan, repayable over 15 years, for the construction of schools, a hospital, two power stations and several factories. After Damba's fall a slight chill in Sino-Mongol relations was noticed. In abandoning the use of the Russian alphabet in Inner Mongolia, as decreed in 1959, Peking either intended to bring about the breaking of this fundamental link between Mongols on both sides of the frontier, or this meant that the Mongol inhabitants of the Chinese Autonomous Region had been deported far from their native land. Meanwhile, despite Tsedenbal's return to power, Peking pursued its policy of co-operation with Ulan Bator. Chou En-lai made his way to the Mongolian ca where, on 31 May 1960, he signed an agreer with Tsedenbal which included a new US$50 mi loan.

The question of the two countries' com borders took longer to settle. A first agreement signed publicly in December 1962. A second ag ment, reached on 30 June 1964, ratified the first fixed China's northern border with Mongolia alo distance of more than 4,350 kilometres. This app to have been done hurriedly and with at least a Chinese territorial concessions. The chief signific of this agreement lies in China's apparent aban ing of its claim to authority over the whol Mongolia.

Despite these agreements the PRC has decl on various occasions that it still intends to set Chinese protectorate in Mongolia. In July 1964 Tse-tung told a group of Japanese journalists Mongolia, then "dominated by the Soviet Uni should become a Chinese province again.

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THE Sino-Soviet split became open in 1963. When news of the split was comm cated to Tsedenbal, he reaffirmed Mongolia's Soviet stance. In a speech devoted to the mi situation in Mongolia, he declared before the C Hural: "The atomic power of the USSR is a bu which guarantees the security of the whole wo His audience understood this to mean that Mon could not dispense with the Soviet "nuclear um la" for its security. On 30 March 1964 Tsede signed a new agreement with Moscow arranging the building of fortifications along its frontiers China.

Relations between Peking and Ulan B deteriorated in 1964. A clause in the aid agreer which referred to a Chinese labour force in Mong arose the MPR leaders' suspicions. In effect, on strength of this clause, any Chinese living Mongolia had the right to take Mongol nation and settle in the country. The implementing of clause could have lead to the establishing Chinese Fifth Column in Mongolia. In May of year the Ulan Bator Government delivered a pr note to the Peking Government referring to "unacceptable" activities of the Chinese Embass Mongolia in distributing propaganda tracts et two months the 40,000 Chinese workers were pelled from Mongolia. In July, during a cy contest in Ulan Bator, the Chinese and Mo participants came to blows. The Mongol militia insulted by the Chinese and the incident deterio into a general mêlée with several injured. A protest note was sent to Peking. At the same *Unen*, the official organ of the MRP, publish

tement by Mongol students studying in Peking iming that they had seen a map printed in China which "our country did not figure".

Confronted by this serious situation, President nbuu went to Moscow on 5 September 1964 to d out what the Soviet reaction would be in the e of a sudden Chinese attack on his country. He s assured of total Soviet military support in case of den danger. After President Sambuu's return to n Bator on 9 September, the official news ncy, *Montsame*, published the following "autho- d" declaration: "For a long time the Chinese ders have harboured the intention of laying their nds on Mongolia. Their attitudes are the ex- ssion of an imperialist policy inherited from the nchu conquerors. The sinister designs of the nese against the independence of the MPR are as urd as they are impracticable."

After a short lull, Sino-Mongol relations de- orated again during the Cultural Revolution. n Bator accused the Maoists of having illegally ggled into Mongolia 20,000 "little red books" in 7-68, and 30,000 in 1969, and to have distributed m from the Chinese Embassy with the help of nese activists. The Mongolian Government dis- ered that a package of drugs sent from China to Ulan Bator hospital in fact contained posters traying Mao Tse-tung, "little red books" and Mao ges. The most serious incident took place in ing in 1967 when a Mongolian diplomat was treated. Mongolia and China recalled their bassadors.

The ambassadors did not return to their pective posts until 1971 when there was a slight provement in relations between the two countries. nmercial protocols were signed, but economic tions remained at a very low key. Over the years pro-Chinese minority faction of the MRP was idated.

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HAVING neither technicians nor Chinese work- ers in Mongolia, Peking in March 1973 agreed hand back to the Mongolian Government seven inished aid projects which, according to the inal agreement, should have remained Chinese perty until their completion. These reverted to numerous Soviet technicians working in Mongo- which prompted Peking propaganda to denounce colonization of Mongolia by the Soviet Union. lowing Marshal Grechko's visit to Mongolia, ing Radio announced: "The USSR has construct- a large number of military bases, including sile launching sites in Mongolia and maintains a vy concentration of Soviet troops along the Sino- ngol border."

From its side Mongolia accused China of repeatedly violating its frontiers since 1969. These accusations were published in autumn 1973 by the Mongolian publication *Uzga Dzohiol Urlag* (Art and Literature) and were widely disseminated not only in Mongolian and Soviet propaganda organs but also by Mongol spokesmen at international fora. These accusations aimed to refute Peking's claim to be the "natural friend of small and medium-sized countries and the defender of their vital interests", and to expose China's ambitions for leadership of the Third World and its desire for world hegemony. The most serious accusations referred to 151 military exercises which had been held near the frontier between 1969 and July 1973. Chinese soldiers, it was claimed, had penetrated Mongolian territory where they had taken reconnaissance photographs of military installations and had slaughtered Mongol cattle. On the political front China was accused of slandering "the socialist reality of Mongolia", the country's achievements in general and above all its alliance with the Soviet Union.

On the international front China countered the Mongolian initiatives favourable to Moscow. Thus at the UN on 2 October 1973, Chiao Kuan-hua, Deputy Foreign Minister of the PRC, condemned the Soviet proposal for an Asian collective security pact of which Mongolia had shown itself to be a stalwart supporter. Mongolian support for the Soviet initiative dates back to April 1969, when a Mongol delegation, headed by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Burma and Cambodia, with a view to drumming up regional support for Moscow's proposals. As Mongolia is unabashedly in the Soviet camp, its representatives can allow themselves the luxury of incurring China's wrath, which the "selling" of Moscow's collective security system surely does. Other Communist countries in East Asia, such as the Indo-China states, who are either, as in Vietnam's case, pursuing a policy of equilibrium between the USSR and China, or, as in Cambodia's case, more aligned with China, have not openly endorsed the Soviet proposal. Thus Ulan Bator did not find any approval in Hanoi when it was canvassing the Soviet proposal. But, as Ulan Bator is probably Moscow's most loyal Asian ally, the Soviet Union will almost certainly continue to use Mongolia as a "front" for winning allies in both Communist and non-Communist East Asia.

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THE upheavals which took place in the Indo-China peninsula in 1975, leading to important changes on the political map of the region, could not fail to have repercussions in Ulan Bator. The Communist military success was achieved with the use of the most modern Soviet matériel, some of which reached Indo-China by way of Mongolia. It is not forgotten by the parties involved that during the

Cultural Revolution some of the Russian armaments destined for North Vietnam were impounded on Chinese territory by Maoist activists, making it necessary to send North Vietnamese officials to accompany the convoys across China. A Hanoi-dominated reunified Vietnam, with a pro-Soviet orientation would be a matter of acute concern for Peking, given the North Vietnamese leaders' apparent desire to extend Hanoi's influence in the region. Chinese preoccupation with a strong, unified Vietnam could become such a matter of priority Peking, as to bring about a lessening of pressure on Mongolia, or at least a tempo acceptance of the *status quo*. This in turn w make a serious Chinese challenge to Russian pr minance in Mongolia less feasible. In the short at any rate, whether Peking likes it or not, Mon appears to be firmly fixed in the Soviet ca contributing thus to the "encirclement" which Chinese leaders so fear.

Notes and References

1. Arcady Stolypine, *La Mongolie entre Moscou et Pékin* (Editions Stock, Paris, 1971), p. 104.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 179, 180.

AW OF THE SEA: *On the occasion of the third session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, in New York, the author, an international lawyer, provides a study of island disputes in East Asia. He puts this into a wider context by comparing previous efforts to arrive at satisfactory geographical and legal definitions of islands, and to provide a universally acceptable framework for delimitation in disputes involving islands.*

East Asia and the Régime of Islands

Phiphat Tangsubkul

CERTAIN islands and groups of islands in East Asia have obscure titles to ownership or are claimed by more than one nation. Some ll islands situated near the seaward termini of d boundaries are subject to dispute: a good mple is Poulo Wai Island in the Gulf of Siam, t has been claimed by both Cambodia and South tnam. Similarly, groups such as the Spratlies, ated in the South China Sea, have in the past n the subject of claims by various countries. Both nas and Japan dispute the ownership of the Tiao Tai (Senkaku) Islands (1) and the demarcation of r continental shelf boundary. The Tiao Yu Tai e is analogous to the dispute between South ea and Japan over the Danjo Gunto and Tori ma Islands(2) in the East China Sea. And, in t is potentially the most serious dispute of all, na is in disagreement with Japan and South Korea r rights to oil and gas deposits presumed to lie in East Asia's continental shelf, — one of the gest and quite possibly richest submarine basins in world. In the Andaman Sea, the delimitation of boundary between Thailand and Burma presents e difficulties, owing to claims by both sides to ership of some tiny islands at the southern end of Mergui Archipelago; this dispute is at the ment under negotiation between the two coun- s.

International attention was first brought to us on the island problem in East Asia in 1974 the sudden occupation by the PRC (People's ublic of China) of the Paracel Islands in the th China Sea. Peking had never before used itary force in prosecuting its claims to the acels or any other of the vast number of islands l reefs sprinkled around the South China Sea(3). ording to the *New China News Agency*, the South Vietnamese moved first: Saigon's harassment of fishing boats and assaults on the islands took place on 15-19 January 1974, before the PRC patrol boats intervened. Saigon's denouncing of Chinese "aggression" aside, China appears only to have repaid in kind, in order to make clear that it took its claims in the South China Sea seriously(4). Peking insists that its legal right to the Paracels dates back 2,000 years, to the Han dynasty. Saigon traces its claim back to the reign of the Vietnamese Emperor Gia Long at the beginning of the nineteenth century(5). The Paracel Islands are now completely under PRC control.

During the past ten years, both South Vietnam and China have issued statements reasserting their claims to the Spratlies, situated South of the Paracels, about 280 miles South-east of Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam. The Spratlies, like many other groups of islets, form an important breeding ground for birds. In 1917 a Japanese company started to exploit the guano deposits there, and continued until French warships chased them off in 1929. The French occupied the islands in 1933(6). The PRC's claims to the Spratlies have in the past been challenged by France, the Philippines, the former Republic of Vietnam and Taiwan. Finally, Saigon formally incorporated the Spratly Islands into the coastal province of Phuoc Thuy. Also, Vietnamese troops have been stationed on Nam Yit, another of the atolls(7). In 1971 Philippine troops were sent to the Itu Aba islets, which are situated close to the Spratlies. During this incident a Chinese fisherman from Taiwan was reportedly shot and killed. Peking warned that the presence of the troops was an "open violation of China's territorial sovereignty by the Philippine Government — absolutely not to be tolerated by the Chinese Government and people"(8).

With the Soviet Union's slowly improving relations with the Marcos Government, together with possible Soviet interest in oil exploration off the Philippine coast and increasing Russian fleet passage to the Indian Ocean(9), not to mention the added fuel of Sino-Soviet animosity, Soviet support for a Philippine claim vis-à-vis the PRC seems a possibility. Notwithstanding, Moscow has also reiterated its support for Hanoi's claim to the Spratlies several times. The US position is that the question of sovereignty over the Spratlies and the other reefs and atolls is still open. Nevertheless, it has been suggested in the Philippines that American oil companies and the American military may also be interested in the Spratlies' oil-bearing and strategic potential(10).

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BEARING in mind the island disputes in the East Asian region, it is this author's purpose to examine the various attempts made to provide geographical or juridical definitions, adequate for the resolution of such disputes on an international basis. The first Law of the Sea Conference was held in Geneva in 1958, and resulted in the signing of four "Law of the Sea" Conventions. Since then the international community has directed much more attention to the uses of the sea and the sea-bed. During the past decade, political leaders, lawyers, diplomats and marine technicians have debated widely on the establishment of a legal framework for the peaceful exploitation of ocean resources. At last, these discussions have been given added urgency by the decision taken by the United Nations General Assembly at its 1970 session to hold another general conference on the Law of the Sea. Thus the first session of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974. The experts from 149 states then moved to Geneva in June 1975 for the second session. But, with the negotiations still unsettled, a third session was scheduled to begin last month, on 15 March 1976, at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

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ONE of the most troublesome features of these complex political/juridical negotiations has proved to be the very question of islands, for there are many different ways in which islands can be considered in the Law of the Sea context, — islands considered as base points, archipelagos, atolls, or even as "islands"; on top of these are the questions concerning islands and their territorial waters, islands and their continental shelves, and islands and their economic zones. The issues are undoubtedly highly involved and it is very possible that the Third Conference will not be able to reach an uniform agreement regarding the régime of islands.

The lack of internationally recognized definitions regarding the status of islands makes resolution of island disputes extremely difficult East Asia, such disputes have plagued the re since the famous case of the Island of Miangas Palmas) (11) in 1906. This study is devoted problems concerning islands that have histori been integrated as part of a coastal state juridically claimed by one or several littoral c tries. Our analysis is, therefore, limited to the s of islands "as islands" which differ in legal s from "archipelagos" and "archipelagic states" w the Law of the Sea context. In other words, trend of our analysis is based on the assumption an island is a separate entity, with its own rég but can at the same time be a component pa another entity called an archipelago. In turn, archipelago is also a separate entity, which coul should have its own régime, and can at the s time be a component of another separate entit the archipelagic state.

"Archipelagic state", as a separate entity its own independent characteristics, is a new co in Law of the Sea definition, and has its own sp régime of privileges and obligations. At the s time there has been a tendency not to regard archipelago, whether coastal or outlying, a separate entity and to deny it a separate régime. analysis has application to all islands except "i states".

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THE globe is generally viewed as comprising mited number of continental landmasses tha conceived as "mainlands" of the earth. Groupe the conventional concept of seven continents, are as follows(12):

	Continent	Area
(1)	Asia	18,506,328 sq.mi
(2)	Africa	11,732,532 "
(3)	North America	9,362,921 "
(4)	South America	6,879,450 "
(5)	Antarctica	5,165,000 "
(6)	Australia	3,302,400 "
(7)	Europe	2,718,087 "
	TOTAL	57,666,718 sq.mi

In addition, there are more than half a m portions of subcontinental land territory, situ above mean high water at all times, which defined generally as "islands". Approximately 7 cent of the land area of the world is made u oceanic islands(14), and these are situated in v and dissimilar patterns throughout the world. may perch immediately adjacent to the contin masses or be dispersed in mid-ocean(15). Islan the Indian Ocean tend to possess a similar in dispersion (although in linear, rather than ar

m), — e.g. those found to the South of India and jacent to Burma and the West coast of Thailand, mely the Andaman and Nicobar islands(16) and Mergui Archipelago(17). But further East, ar- ate island chains rim the continent, ranging from Chang and Ko Kut (Thailand), Koh Kong, Koh ng, Koh Tang (Cambodia), Phu Quoc (Vietnam), inan (China), Hong Kong and Formosa. By trast, in the central and southern Pacific Ocean, nds are randomly scattered(18).

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THE 1958 Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva addressed itself to the *geographical* definition of nds: article 10 of the resulting Geneva Convention the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone stated "An island is a naturally formed area of land, rounded by water, which is above water at high ". We can say that this definition was a broad generic one embracing such clearly different l formations as islands, islets, reefs and rocks. what significance could such a definition possess pplied to all the categories, ranging from an d state to a rocky headland? Could all these nations conceivably be granted equal maritime e, as appeared to be claimed for them? At this t it would be useful to refer to the recent sification of islands made by the American grapher, Hodgson:

- **Rocks** should have an area less than 0.001 of a square mile, and are natural forms of land which constitute high tide elevations. Because of their small size, rocks are unfit for human habitation, and as a result, their value is negligible. They can conceivably be used as sites for navigation lights. Their occupation depends entirely on external support.

- **Islets** are larger than rocks, i.e. between 0.001 and 1 square mile in area. They can, under certain select circumstances, support human habitation on a limited scale.

- **Isles** are greater than 1 square mile but not more than 1,000 square miles in area. They can maintain significant populations, where climate, soil, land forms, etc. are favourable. Under certain conditions, they can form the major core area of small insular states.

- **Islands** are larger than 1,000 square miles, and are generally inhabited.

If we determine the size of islands in accordwith the Hodgson classification, in East Asia we 34 islands have areas in excess of 1,000 square miles with a total land area of 1,265,132 square miles, i.e. 33.48 per cent of the world's oceanic islands (See Tables at rear).

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MOVING from purely geographical definition to the question of the **legal** status of islands, it is necessary, first, to examine the main proposals made by the 1954 International Law Commission, then study in detail the 1958 Geneva Convention and then the new concepts suggested to the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.

At a meeting of the International Law Commission convened on 1 July 1954 to study problems of maritime delimitation, Mr. François, the special rapporteur, referred back to the work done at the 1930 Conference for the Codification of International Law held at the Hague, which had also addressed itself to Law of the Sea problems. He cited six possible cases in which he proposed that the legal status of "island" could be granted:

- A natural island having its own territorial sea.

- An island formed artificially, by accumulation; for example, of sand or rubble, would also have its own belt of territorial sea. There was a question of whether states had the right to erect artificial islands beyond their own territorial waters, as that would allow them to appropriate large stretches of the high seas. Other states had the right to object to such action, and if the island was already erected, could refuse to recognize it and the territorial sea surrounding it. If, however, such an artificial island were erected and no state objected to its erection, it would be entitled to have its own belt of territorial sea.

- The third case was that of a lighthouse on an area of land permanently above the high water mark. It would *ipso facto* enjoy the status of an island and have its own territorial sea.

- If the lighthouse were built on an area of land which was only above water at low tide, the area of land would not qualify as an island and would not have its own territorial sea, neither its own safety zone.

- The fifth case referred to technical installations other than lighthouses. Such installations, involved in the exploitation of the sea bed, should not have their own

territorial sea, but only a safety zone, justified by their great vulnerability.

- The sixth case was that of dwellings which were on piles erected in the sea and groups of such dwellings which constituted actual villages. In this case Mr. François asked the Commission to decide whether such villages should be treated in the same way as technical installations and denied them a territorial sea of their own. He emphasized that the question was important for South-east Asia, where such villages were often bases for drug traffickers, smugglers and pirates. If they had no territorial sea surrounding them, nothing could be done to suppress such activities, and his draft article 11 accordingly provided that they should be deemed to be islands.

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HOWEVER, the 1958 Geneva Conference could not find a common compromise definition that applied to all categories of island. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone simply stipulated two main articles concerning the geological/legal definition of an island (Articles 10 and 11):

Article 10

An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.

An island can have its own territorial waters.

Article 11

A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.

Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.

The Convention tried to differentiate between the legal status of an island and that of a low-tide elevation. But naturally formed areas of land w are surrounded by water and situated above wate the time at high tide are often very large ind Thus, the Geneva Convention failed to achieve international agreement with regard to the minim size of islands, thus allowing coastal states to c rocks as islands in order to extend their territ waters or even their exclusive economic zones.

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IT SEEMED to the author that very few vances were made at the 1974 Caracas ference concerning the régime of islands. But t were some proposals that introduced new cone concerning islands, such as the draft articles "islands and on territories under foreign domina or control" that were submitted to the See Committee(19) by 4 Pacific island nations, — New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa. T articles postulated that an island has, besides its territorial sea, its own economic zone and its continental shelf. But the proposal still to ignored the size of islands. Nevertheless, the Ro nian(20) and Turkish draft articles on the régim islands(21) tried in different ways to distinguish status of islands from that of islets and that of r

The Romanian draft articles suggested tha islet is a naturally formed elevation of land less one square kilometre in area, surrounded by w which is above water at high tide; and that an i should be more than one square kilometre remained an open question for the Conferenc determine which islands can be inhabited and w cannot be inhabited, or cannot have their economic life. Moreover, the Romanian prop considered that islets and islands which are situ beyond the territorial sea, on the continental she in the economic zone of the same state, may have their own security zone, but no excl economic zone nor continental shelf. The aim o proposal is to prevent coastal states expanding economic zone more than 200 miles.

The Turkish draft articles suggested precisely that an island which is under the contr a distant foreign state, but which is situated clo the coast of another state should not have its economic zone or continental shelf. Furthermor island (or group of islands, such as the Andama Nicobar islands), situated in the economic zone the continental shelf of other states should also no economic zone nor continental shelf of its ow it does not contain at least one tenth of the area and population of the state to which it bel The turkish proposal will certainly be unpo with big countries such as the United States, USSR, India, China, and Australia.

The Turkish draft articles have stipulated

gal status of islands which could not have economic e and which are situated outside the territorial sea the same state, from islands which have economic e or can be inhabited. The latter *ipso facto* extend ir own economic zone or continental shelf, while nds which cannot sustain economic life and which e situated outside the territorial sea of the same te cannot have their own economic zone or ntinental shelf. At the same time, the Turkish posals postulated that rocks and low-tide elevans should not have their own marine space, i.e. ritorial sea, continental shelf or economic zone. wever this draft has still not stipulated the size of nds or rocks.

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ANOTHER document that should be studied is the "Informal Single Negotiating Text"(22) ch was prepared by the Chairman of the Second mmittee of the Third Conference, and that will e as a basis for negotiation in the current nference. Referring to the "régime of islands", cle 132 of the Text defined that: "an island is a urally formed area of land, surrounded by water, ch is above water at high tide". This geographic nition was copied from paragraph 1 of Article 10 the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial and the Contiguous zone. Furthermore, article added that an island shall have, besides its own itorial sea, its own contiguous zone, its own usive economic zone and its own continental f. On the other hand, rocks which cannot sustain an habitation or economic life of their own shall e no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Text considered that, generally, rocks should e a territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental f and economic zone of their own. It is only s which cannot sustain economic life and cannot inhabited that should not have their own usive economic zone and continental shelf, but e should still have a territorial sea and contiguzone.

Nevertheless, it seems to the author that, if rocks or islets were to be given full ocean space, ight mean that the access of other countries to exploitation of the living resources in what was resent the open sea would be curtailed, and that area of the sea-bed falling under the proposed rnational Sea-Bed Authority would also be red. Of course, we are deeply in sympathy with support the wish of owner states of islands to a full marine space for guarding the natural urces, whose exploitation will contribute to the lopment of their countries.

Article 12 of the Text states that a low-tide ation which is situated at a distance exceeding breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland n island, has no territorial sea of its own. The uage of the Text makes it clear that a low-tide elevation found outside territorial waters cannot have its own maritime space as an island. It can only have its own territorial sea if it is located inside the territorial waters of the same state.

However, the "Single Negotiating Text" suggests no size criterion and locational requirement in relation to the mainland. Neither did the text touch on the question of population or the absence thereof. It is thus very necessary that the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea should arrive at some equitable principle for determining the extent of the maritime space surrounding islands, specifically a method based on the "clear-cut principle", for the delimitation of island ocean space or sea-bed area in the case of adjacent states or states situated opposite one another.

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APART from national pride, the chief reason for the recent upsurge of interst in Asia's offshore islands lies in the fact that geologists have reported the existence of rich undersea-bed oil deposits throughout the China Seas. Today the question of who owns which of these "natural forms of land surrounded by water at high tide" is one of the hottest diplomatic issues in Asia, in which nearly every Asian nation is involved. The juridical/political outlook for the island controversy is not very hopeful, unless the Third Conference of the Law of the Sea is able to work out an approach which could be endorsed by the international community as soon as possible. After two full sessions of the Third Conference, the success in reaching a compromise between the wildly differing positions of maritime nations regarding the régime of islands seems very slight. That, in turn, will mean that the prospect for continuing conflict over islands in Asia remains high.

In the author's view, where the juridical aspect of island definition is concerned, the delimitation issue (including the territorial sea boundary, the continental shelf boundary and the economic zone boundary) is essentially dependent on the territorial status of the islands in question. Settlement of the former would hardly be possible unless the latter were first resolved. We are of the view that the juridical aspect of island definition should be based on the following principles:

- The **size** of the island: an uniform agreement on the classification of the size of islands, islets and rocks must be achieved.

- The **location** and the **contiguity** to the principal territory: a small mid-ocean island or a small group of islets or rocks, lying outside the economic zone of the coastal state or lying on the continental shelf or in the economic zone of an-

other coastal state, should not have the legal status of islands found a short distance from the coast.

- The consideration of the **population** and the **economic life** of the island, or the absence thereof.

- The **geological configuration.**

- The **history** of the island.

Ideally coastal states' claims arising out of disputed interpretations of the above principles should be put to a competent international authority, with a clear mandate for arbitration.

TABLE I

Three islands in East Asia with an area in excess of 100,000 square miles:

Islands	Site	Area (Sq. miles)
1) New Guinea	Indonesian Archipelago	316,856
2) Borneo	" "	286,967
3) Sumatra	" "	182,860

TABLE II

Eleven islands with an area in excess of 10,000 square miles:

Islands	Site	Area (Sq. miles)
1) Honshu	Japan	88,930
2) Celebes	Indonesia	72,986
3) Java	Indonesia	50,745
4) Luzon	Philippines	40,814
5) Mindanao	Philippines	36,906
6) Hokkaido	Japan	29,950
7) Ceylon	Sri Lanka	25,332
8) Kyushu	Japan	16,251
9) Formosa	China Sea	13,885
10) Hainan	South China Sea	13,127
11) Timor	Indonesian Archipelago	13,094

TABLE III

Twenty islands in Asia with an area in excess of 1,000 square miles:

Islands	Site	Area (Sq.
1) Shikoku	Japan	7,245
2) Halmahera	Indonesia	6,870
3) Ceram	Indonesia	6,044
4) Sumbawa	Indonesia	5,965
5) Flores	Indonesia	5,511
6) Samar	Philippines	5,124
7) Negros	Philippines	4,905
8) Palawan	Philippines	4,500
9) Panay	Philippines	4,441
10) Sumba	Indonesia	4,300
11) Mindoro	Philippines	3,794
12) Leyte	Philippines	3,090
13) Bali	Indonesia	2,241
14) Billiton	Indonesia	1,866
15) Lombok	Indonesia	1,824
16) Madura	Indonesia	1,763
17) Buton	Indonesia	1,754
18) Cebu	Philippines	1,701
19) Bohol	Philippines	1,492
20) Wetar	Indonesia	1,400

Notes and References

The Tiao Yu Tai Islands consist of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks situated about 120 nautical miles North-east of Taiwan, and about 200 nautical miles West of Okinawa. See Choon-Ho Park, *Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy* (Harvard Law School Journal, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1973) p. 248.

The Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima Islands lie betwen South Korea and South-west Japan in the East China Sea: *ibid.*, p. 214.

China has a coastline of approximately 11,000 kilometres. 3,416 Chinese islands add another 10,000 kilometres to this figure. See Choon-Ho Park, *ibid.*, p. 229.

Michael Morrow, "Today Hsisha, tomorrow.....?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 January 1974, p. 32.

"Storm in the China Sea", *Time*, 4 February 1974, p. 9.

Leon Howell and Michael Morrow, "Formidable task for Peking", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 December 1973, p. 39.

Ibid., p. 39.

According to the British High Commission in Singapore, "The Spratly Islands were a Chinese dependency, part of Kwangtung Province, and were returned to China after the war. We cannot find any indication of their having been acquired by any other country and so can only conclude that they are still held by Communist China". *Ibid.*, p. 39.

Leon Howell and Michael Morrow, *op. cit.*

Ibid.

The island of Miangas (or Palmas) lies about half way between Cape San Augustin (Mindanao, The Philippines) and the most northerly island of the Nanusa group (Indonesia) at latitude 6° 65 North and longitude 127° East. The dispute concerned sovereignty over this island, which was claimed by both the United States and the Netherlands. See Llewellyn Pfankuchen, "A Documentary Textbook in International Law" (New York, 1940), p. 193.

12. Hodgson, Robert D., *Islands: Normal and Special Circumstance*, (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, USA, 1973).

13. The areas are in square statute miles, i.e. 1 square statute mile = 0.755 square nautical mile.

14. Hodgson, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 8.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

16. The Andaman and Nicobar islands, which belong to India, lie about 200 kilometres from the western coast of the South of Thailand, and to the North of Sumatra.

17. The Mergui Archipelago, which belongs to Burma, lies along the southern coast of its mainland.

18. Hodgson, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 23.

19. UN document, A/CONF 62/C. 2/L/30.

20. UN document, A/CONF 62/C. 2/L/53.

21. UN document, A/CONF 62/C. 2/L/55.

22. At its 55th. plenary meeting on 18 April 1975, the Conference decided to request the Chairman of the three Main Committees to prepare a single negotiating text covering the subjects entrusted to each Committee. The Conference's President stressed that the single text should take account of all the formal and informal discussions held so far, that it should be informal in character, not prejudice the position of any delegation, nor represent any negotiated text or accepted compromise. It should, therefore, be quite clear that the single negotiating text would serve as a procedural device and only provide a basis for negotiation. It must not in any way be regarded as affecting either the status of proposals already made by delegations or the right of delegations to submit amendments or new proposals. See UN document A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Part II.

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